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ABSTRACT 
The convergence or persistence debates as to different corporate 
governance models have attracted international attention in the past few 
years.  This article looks at the development of director regulation in China 
in the past two decades to examine the differing standpoints in the debates.  
The emergence of a modern board of directors came along with the 
enterprise reforms of the early 1990s in China.  Thereafter, with the 
growing importance of the board in practice, more efforts have been made 
to promote its effectiveness.  At first sight, the Chinese board system seems 
to have moved away from civil law traditions towards common law regimes 
in the last two decades, since more Japanese rules have been transplanted 
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into China at the initial stage, whilst later American norms and concepts 
have had greater influence.  Nevertheless, the skeleton of the Chinese board 
is very distinctive from advanced economies, which has persisted—albeit 
with some changes—through the years.  Hence, it is argued that the process 
of adopting foreign norms and mechanisms for director regulation in China 
can neither be conceptualized as convergence nor persistence.  Rather, it is a 
process of sinonization in which foreign norms and institutions are filtered 
and localized into the Chinese context.  
INTRODUCTION
In the dynamic world of corporate governance reform, both business and 
academic circles have become increasingly interested in the future of 
different corporate governance models.  In the past few years, the 
convergence or persistence debates have fueled a new wave of corporate 
governance research upsurge.  While convergence optimism argues for the 
superiority of the Anglo–American model of shareholder capitalism over 
other alternatives,1 the path dependence theorists emphasize the determining 
nature of both history and politics in the evolution of corporate governance.2
This Article focuses on the development of director regulation in the context 
of the corporate governance reforms in China as a case to examine the 
differing standpoints in the convergence or persistence debates.  It is argued 
that the process of adopting foreign norms and mechanisms for director 
regulation in China can neither be conceptualized as convergence nor 
persistence.  Rather, it is a process of sinonization in which foreign norms 
and institutions are filtered and localized into the Chinese context.  
Corporate governance in China has experienced a number of changes in 
the past two decades.  Among them, regulation of the board of directors3 is 
one classic field in modern corporate governance that Chinese laws have 
stepped into and developed length by length.  The emergence of a modern 
1. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440 (2001).
2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999). 
3. The “board” is understood in the narrow sense in this Article, which only refers 
to those members with management powers.  Those members of the board whose major task 
is monitoring, such as the supervisory board in civil law and the independent directors in 
common law, are not featured in the discussions here.  The sphere of director regulation in 
this Article involves a number of legal mechanisms which both constrain their behaviors and 
mold their incentives so as to align their interests with the owners, such as the appointment 
and removal of directors, powers of the board, civil liabilities of the board of directors, and 
regulations of the remuneration packages.  Since directors in a company are regulated both 
individually and collegially, there are two layers of discussions in the article: first, the 
powers and rights of the board of directors; second, the duties and incentive stimulating 
mechanisms of the directors.  Both of them are observed from the perspective of the 
principal–shareholders and agent–directors relationship. 
2011] Director Regulation in China 503
board of directors comes along with the enterprise reforms of the early 
1990s in China.  Thereafter, with the growing importance of the board in 
practice, more efforts are made to promote its effectiveness.  At first sight, 
the Chinese board system seems to have moved away from civil law 
traditions towards common law regimes in the last two decades, since more 
Japanese rules have been transplanted into China at the initial stage, whilst 
later American norms and concepts have had greater influence.  
Nevertheless, a more detailed review reveals that such an observation is 
very shallow.  What China has borrowed from developed countries are only 
forms and details rather than substances and structures, and the skeleton of 
the Chinese board that is very distinctive from advanced economies has 
persisted albeit with some changes through the years.  The trajectory of the 
evolution of the Chinese board is better described as a process of 
sinonization.  On one hand, although a great deal of foreign regulation is 
imported, the substantive infrastructure established in China is unique 
compared with other jurisdictions.  On the other hand, the effectiveness of 
the Chinese board is doubtful, owing to the embedded political, social and 
economic conditions.  Hence, it is concluded that, in terms of director 
regulation, China is not moving towards a particular model from any other 
countries.  Sinonization is a more appropriate description of the corporate 
governance reforms in China.  
This Article first briefly traces the history of the board of directors and 
reviews the legal framework for the board of directors in the early 1990s.  
With real–time comparative analysis of the equivalent rules in Germany, 
Japan, the UK, and the US, it is discovered that Chinese legal arrangements, 
although borrowing more rules from Japan than other countries, form a 
self–contained camp due to their structural peculiarities.  Rationales for 
such uncommon legal settings are subsequently elaborated.  Then the 
Article assesses the efforts made at the turn of the new millennium to 
promote the board of directors, and considers the constant mixing nature of 
these new developments.  It is conceived that at this stage, more US–style 
mechanisms have been adopted in China, but the basic structure of the 
Chinese board has not been substantively changed.  The dysfunctions of the 
board after all these reforms are examined and the causes giving rise to 
these issues are analyzed.  Followed this assessment is an analysis of the 
progress in 2005 and thereafter.  The major legislative movements are 
studied, and the uniqueness of the adjusted framework is also addressed.  
The Article then further examines the ineffectiveness of the board of 
directors due to pitfalls in the law and the unchanged institutional 
background.  Finally, the Article summarizes the full analysis of boards of 
directors in the whole Article with a description of sinonization of corporate 
governance.  
504 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:3 
I.  ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOARD SYSTEM 
A. Back to the History 
The development of a separate board of directors was accompanied by 
the emergence of modern corporate laws.  Tracing back the historical roots, 
today’s corporate board found its antecedents simultaneously in England 
and continental Europe during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.4  Later, 
the norm of using a governing board was reinforced and spread to other 
countries such as the U.S. and Japan in the colonization process and with 
the introduction of western technology and ideas. 5   At the turn of the 
twentieth century, the board of directors, through a series of legal reforms 
and legislative movements, became free from interference from 
shareholders in the general meeting and gradually earned its independent 
status as a corporate organ.6  In China, the large scale of the introduction of 
western civilization and institutions after the Opium War also brought about 
the modern corporate system, of which the board system was an 
indispensable part.  However, the board of directors was not completely 
separate from the shareholders at that time, because the principle that 
“corporate directors should be elected from members of the corporation by 
the general assembly” had been maintained in corporate law revisions 
through the years.7  After the founding of new China in 1949, particularly 
after the completion of the socialist transformation in 1956, the board 
system was abandoned with the demolition of modern corporate governance 
in China.  It was not until the preliminary stage of the enterprise reforms in 
the 1980s that the theme of “separation between ownership and 
management” was picked up again.8  Unfortunately, reform measures taken 
in this period, such as the factory manager responsibility system                
( ), despite the involvement of autonomy expansion for 
enterprises, did not have the features of a modern board system.9  
  
 4. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate 
Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004). 
 5. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and the Spread of the Corporate 
Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN 
COMPANY LAW 300-01 (2003); 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON 
CORPORATIONS 410 (2d ed. 2003). 
 7. See ZHANG ZHONGMIN, JIANNAN DE BIANQIAN: JINDAI ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHIDU 
YANJIU [DIFFICULT CHANGES: RESEARCH ON CORPORATE SYSTEM IN MODERN CHINA (1842-
1949)] 431 (2002).  
 8. See Chen Qi, Woguo Guoyou Qiye Gaizhi De Lishi Huigu Ji Quxian MBO De 
Kexingxing Sikao [The History of China’s State-owned Enterprise Restructuring and the 
Feasibility of Curved MBO], 2 BEIFANG JINGJI  [NORTHERN ECON.] 20 (2006). 
 9. For the features and problems of the factory manager responsibility system, see 
Wang Yanlin & Tian Yinzhi, Guanyu Changzhang Fuzezhi De Ruogan Wenti [Issues 
Regarding the Factory Manager Responsibility System], 2 FAXUE PINGLUN [L.REV.] 44 
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B. Legislation in the Early 1990s 
In 1992, the first batch of national corporate laws was promulgated by a 
number of governmental bodies. Among them stood out the Joint–Stock 
Companies Regulatory Opinions ( ) (“JCRO”) which, 
for the first time in China, regarded the board of directors as completely 
separate from the shareholders.  The law provided a number of rules 
governing this independent corporate organ, such as the legal status, 
composition, and powers of the board; the calling of board meetings; the 
appointment and powers of the chairperson; the appointment, term, 
qualifications and duties of the directors; and the restrictions on share 
transfers of the directors.10  Particularly, the board of directors was hailed as 
the standing corporate authority and should be accountable to the 
shareholders’ meeting.11 
After the test of these laws, Company Law 1993 (“CL 1993”), together 
with Provisional Regulations on the Management of the Issuing and Trading 
of Shares ( ) (“PRMITS”), and Decision 
Concerning the Criminal Punishment of Violations of Company Law           
( ) (“DCPVCL”), succinctly laid down the 
legal basis of the board of directors in China which had profound influence 
thereafter.  Below is an investigation of three major facets of this system at 
that time, including the board of directors as a whole, the chairperson of the 
board, and individual directors.  
Above all, the board of directors, which should be composed of five to 
nineteen members, was the mandatory corporate organ of all joint–stock 
companies (and therefore of all listed companies) and could have been held 
accountable to the shareholders’ general meeting.12  Generally speaking, 
two main aspects of the board of directors, the statutory powers of the board 
and board meetings, were regulated in the laws.  The statutory powers of the 
board of directors, collectively exercised, were stated, and included a 
number of procedural and substantive matters, such as to convene the 
shareholders’ general meeting and report on its work to the shareholders’ 
general meeting; to carry out the resolutions of the shareholders’ general 
  
(1986).  For the failure of old reform measures in improving the intrinsic efficiency of the 
enterprises, see Jean Jinghan Chen, Corporatisation of China’s State-owned Enterprises and 
Corporate Governance, in DAVID H. BROWN & ALASDAIR MACBEAN, CHALLENGES FOR 
CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT: AN ENTERPRISE PERSPECTIVE 59-60 (2005). 
 10. See Gufen Youxian Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Joint-stock Companies Regulatory 
Opinions] & Guojia Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui [State Commission for Restructuring the 
Economic System] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. May 15, 
1992, effective May 15, 1992), arts. 30(6), 52-59, 61-62 (China) [hereinafter JCRO]. 
 11. See JCRO, at art. 52. 
 12. See Gongsi Fa [The Company Law of the Peoples Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 
1994), art. 112 [hereinafter CL 1993]. 
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meeting; to draft and formulate a number of important plans and basic 
administrative systems for the company; to decide on the operational plans, 
investment schemes, internal organizational structure of the company; and 
to appoint and dismiss the senior management.13  Contrary to what pertained 
to limited liability companies, the board of directors of joint–stock 
companies (and therefore all listed companies) was also responsible for the 
formulation of plans for the issuance of debentures.14  As for the board 
meetings, it was required that the board should have held at least two 
meetings each year, the date of which should have been made known to all 
directors ten days prior to the meeting, except for a provisional meeting.15
The meeting could only have been held on condition that no fewer than half 
of the directors were present, and the resolution of the board required the 
approval of no fewer than half of all directors.16  The minutes of the board 
meeting had to be signed by the directors present at the meeting.17
Next, the chairperson of the board, who was designated as the legal 
representative of the company,18 was conferred with a great deal of statutory 
powers under the legal framework of CL 1993.  Other than procedural 
powers (such as presiding over the general meeting and board meetings, 
signing share certificates and debentures),19  the chairperson also had a lot 
of substantive powers, such as inspecting the implementation of resolutions 
of the board, calling for a board meeting,20 and other functions authorized 
by the board collectively.21
Third, the nominations, qualifications, terms, duties, and liabilities of the 
directors were also provided.  The directors were appointed and replaced by 
shareholders in the shareholders’ general meeting, 22  and could not be 
removed from office before the expiry of their terms by the shareholders’ 
general meeting without cause. 23   And there was a list of passive 
qualifications which prevented a person from being appointed as a 
director.24  The term of office of directors was limited to no more than three 
years, but reappointment was permitted.  Furthermore, there were a number 
of articles concerning the statutory duties of directors.  Directors were 
required to perform their duties faithfully, to uphold the interests of the 
company, and to refrain from illegal conduct.  Examples of this included 
using their position for personal gain; taking bribes or accepting other 
13. See CL 1993. 
14. See Id. at art. 112(6). 
15. See Id. at art. 116. 
16. See Id. at art. 117. 
17. See Id. at art. 118. 
18. See Id. at art. 113. 
19. See CL 1993, at art. 114. 
20. Id.
21. See Id. at art. 120. 
22. See Id. at art. 103(2). 
23. See Id. at art. 115. 
24. See Id. at arts. 57, 58. 
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unlawful monies; misappropriating or embezzling company assets; using 
corporate property to provide loans for other parties or to provide 
guarantees for the debts of shareholders or other individuals; engaging in 
business competition or self–dealing; and disclosing company secrets. 25
Directors were also required to sign the minutes of the shareholders’ general 
meeting, which were related to corporate decision making.26  In addition, 
they were required to report to the company on the quantity of shares they 
held, and the shares concerned could not be transferred during their terms of 
office.27  As for listed companies, a reporting system to China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) was adopted, 28  and CSRC, after 
receiving this information, was required to release the reports to the public 
and the investors for reference.29  Liabilities were imposed where behaviors 
of the directors violated these provisions.  It was broadly expressed that 
directors were liable to compensate the company if they breached laws, 
administrative regulations, or the articles of association and caused damage 
to the company.30  In the event that the resolutions of the board contravened 
laws and administrative regulations and infringed the legal interests and 
rights of shareholders, shareholders were conferred with the right of action 
to stop such breach and infringement.31  Directors might also be responsible 
for the resolutions of the board and might be liable for any resulting 
compensation if the resolutions of the board violated laws, administrative 
regulations, or articles of association and caused damage to the company, 
except for the dissenting directors, whose opinions were recorded in the 
minutes of the board meeting. 32   To prevent severe misconduct by the 
directors, criminal liability by the directors for bribery, embezzlement, and 
misappropriation by taking advantage of their offices was provided for by 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“SCNPC”).33
With these laws and regulations, the board of directors was established in 
China.  And it should be noted that this was the first time that a board 
system independent from shareholders was introduced in China.  Before 
that, the board system had been either nonexistent or not completely 
25. See CL 1993, at art. 59-62. 
26. See Id. at art. 109. 
27. See Id. at art. 147. 
28. Gupiao Faxing Yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on the 
Management of the Issuing and Trading of Shares], (promulgated by St. Council, Apr. 22, 
1993, effective Apr. 22, 1993) art. 62 (China) [hereinafter PRMITS]. 
 29. See Id. at art. 64. 
30. See CL 1993, at art. 63. 
31. See CL 1993, at art. 111. 
32. See CL 1993, at art. 118. 
33. See Guanyu Chengzhi Weifan Gongsifa de Fanzui de Jueding[Decision 
Concerning the Criminal Punishment of Violations of Company Law] (promulgated by The 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. (Quanguo Renda Changweihui), Feb. 28, 1995, 
effective Feb. 28, 1995), arts. 9-11 [hereinafter DCCPVCL]. 
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separate from the shareholders, due to overlapping identities of shareholders 
and directors. 
C. The Borrowed but Unique Board  
Relatively speaking, Chinese law pertaining to the board of directors in 
this period adopted a lot more from civil law jurisdictions than from 
common law regimes.  On one hand, some Anglo–American features were 
shared by Chinese law, as some provisions in CL 1993 copied almost 
exactly the corresponding articles in common law countries.  For example, 
the liability exemption for dissenting directors in the board meeting in 
China appeared to closely follow the rule of the Model Business 
Corporation Act in the U.S. 34   On the other hand, civil law traditions 
demonstrated more effect on shaping the Chinese board system.  For 
example, the straightforward approach taken as to the term of office for 
directors in China resembled the normal practice in civil law jurisdictions.  
In Germany, members of the management board (i.e. the counterpart board 
of directors in Germany) were appointed for a period not exceeding five 
years, 35  and the Japanese maximum was two years. 36   Nevertheless, in 
common law jurisdictions, the term of office for directors was more 
complicated.  In the UK, the term was determined by how the board 
directors were “retired by rotation,”37 and in the U.S., it was decided by how 
the terms were “staggered into groups.” 38   In these countries, the total 
number of directors was divided into several groups, and at each annual 
general meeting, the term of one group of board members expired and the 
same number of new directors was chosen.  Therefore, the term of directors 
depended on how many groups the directors were divided into.  
Comparatively speaking, Chinese law was as straightforward as civil law 
jurisdictions in the sense that it spelled out directly the definite maximum 
term of office.39
Particularly, the newly born legislation in China shared a certain degree 
of similarity with Japanese law in terms of the details of legislative 
techniques.  For example, corporate laws in both countries specified the 
minimum notice period for board meetings.  Chinese companies were 
34. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.24(d) (1984).  It was stipulated that unless the 
dissent of the director present at the board meeting was entered in the minutes of the 
meeting, the director was deem to have assented to the corporate action taken.  This section 
is current through the 2007 edition. 
35. See s. 84, para. 3, Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, 
BGBL. I, last amended by Vorst [AG], July 31, 2009 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de/aktg/. 
36. See SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.]  art. 256. (Japan).  
37. See, e.g., Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, tbl. A, art. 73 (Eng.).  
38. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06. 
39. See CL 1993, at art. 115. 
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required to have a ten day notice period,40 while the requirement in Japan 
was one week.41   In contrast, other countries (including other civil law 
countries) usually left it for the corporation to decide how long such a 
period should be.  German law stated that the working methods of the board 
were provided by the bylaws issued by the management board, implying 
that there was no mandatory notice period for a board meeting.42  And in 
common law regimes, the notice period for a board meeting was not 
prescribed in the statutes, either.  In both the UK and the U.S., a 
reasonableness test is laid down in case law pertaining to the minimum 
period of notice for a board meeting.  The “reasonable” period could be a 
matter of days, hours, or even minutes, depending on the circumstances.43  It 
was concluded that both Japan and China regulated matters regarding the 
board more strictly.  The similarities of the board system in both countries 
could further be witnessed by their regulatory approach to the duties of 
directors, where the duty of loyalty was underscored and placed at the 
centre of the rules governing director behaviors.  In common law countries 
including the UK and the U.S., duties of the directors were usually 
categorized into several types, such as the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
care.44  In contrast, civil law countries usually stressed one kind of duty that 
was supposed to be able to cover others.  In Germany, the duty of care stood 
out to be the general principle of the duties of the directors, which covered a 
number of more specific applications of this general duty.45  In Japan, the 
duty of loyalty was regarded as the general principle which included other 
rules as to director behavior in corporate legislations.46  By this comparison, 
it was noted that Chinese company law adopted the same approach as its 
Japanese counterpart, where only a duty of loyalty could be found in 
company law while a duty of care was absent.47  In sum, more features of 
Japanese law were learned by the Chinese legislature than those of other 
countries. 
More commonalities between the Chinese board and the board in civil 
law countries, nevertheless, did not mean that Chinese law governing the 
board of directors was converging towards civil law, or more specifically, 
Japanese law, because these similarities were only in form and detail rather 
40. See CL 1993, at art. 116. 
41. See SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.]  art. 259, para. 2 (Japan). 
42. See AktG, § 77. 
43. See Denis Keenan, SMITH & KEENAN’S COMPANY LAW 398 (12th ed. 2002); COX 
& HAZEN, supra note 6, at 422. 
44. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 370-71, 380; COX & HAZEN, supra note 6, at 476. 
45. See AktG §§ 77, 93. 
46. See Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The 
Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 894
(2003). 
 47. Actually, the duty of care could also be found in the Japanese Civil Code, but this 
duty is only in a general sense instead of aiming at the duty of a director.   See NIPPON NO 
MINPŌ [CIV. C]  art. 644 (Japan). 
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than in substance and structure.  In fact, the differences between the board 
system in China and that of developed countries were so acute that they 
gave the Chinese legal arrangement its own distinctive features and placed it 
in a camp of its own.  At the board level, the Chinese board had far fewer 
powers than its equivalents in advanced economies.48  In the UK, directors 
might “exercise all the powers of the company” unless there were
limitations in the law or the memorandum and articles, and directions given 
by special resolutions.49  In the U.S., similar provisions could be found in 
Delaware General Corporation Law50 and the Model Business Corporation 
Act. 51   In Germany, the Stock Corporation Act conferred on the 
management board the sole duty to manage the corporation which could not 
be delegated to others apart from a few exceptions.52  In Japan, the Reform 
of Commercial Code in 1950 had created a board of directors which 
managed all the business affairs of the company except for those under the 
scope of powers of the shareholders’ general meeting.53  It was noteworthy 
that boards of directors in these countries were all treated as the final, 
decisive authority of a very broad scope of corporate affairs superior to the 
general assembly.  This was the so–called “board centralism.”54  In contrast, 
the Chinese board did not have a range of decision–making powers and 
rights as such.  Under the legal framework of CL 1993, the shareholders’ 
general meeting was empowered with the rights of deciding the business 
policies and investment plans, 55  while the board of directors was only 
entitled to the rights as to business plans and investment programs.56  These 
wordings implied that the general assembly, rather than the board of 
48. See Wu Jianbin, Gouzhu Woguo Xiandai Qiye Zhidu De Kexue Falv Jichu: 
Jianlun Jinyibu Wanshan Woguo Gongsi Lifa De Jige Wenti [Building up a Scientific Legal 
Basis of China’s Modern Enterprise System: Also on Several Issues as to the Further 
Improvement of China’s Corporate Legislations], 1 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE LEGAL SCI.]
30, 32-34 (1998). 
49. See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, tbl. A, art. 70 (Eng.). 
50. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010).  It was stated that the business and 
affairs of every corporation should be, generally speaking, managed by or under the direction 
of the board of directors saving the exceptions in the laws or the certificate of incorporation.  
51. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).  The idea of this section was generally the 
same as Delaware General Corporation Law.  
52. See Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial 
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 129, 157-60 (2009). 
53. See Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate 
Governance: Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 662-65 
(2001). 
54. See Wu Jianbin, Xiandai Gongsi Zhili Jiegou De Xin Qushi [New Trends of 
Modern Corporate Governance], 4 FAXUE ZAZHI [L. SCI. MAG.] 16 (1996).  See also Michael 
J Whincop, The Role of the Shareholder in Corporate Governance: A Theoretical Approach,
25 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 418, 442-45 (2001); SHANGSHI GONGSI FALV GUIZHI LUN [ON THE 
LEGAL REGULATIONS OF LISTED COMPANIES] 26-29 (Zhou Yousu ed., 2006).  
55. See CL 1993, at art. 103. 
56. See CL 1993, at art. 112. 
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directors, was the ultimate authority for making corporate strategies.  Most 
of the powers of the board were very soft, since the preliminary plans and 
schemes made by the board 57  were subject to the approval of the 
shareholders’ general meeting. 58   And the board of directors was also 
required to report on its work to the shareholders’ general meeting and 
implement the resolutions passed by the shareholders’ general meeting,59 
which meant that the residual powers as to the business operation of the 
company not listed in the Law belonged to the general assembly rather than 
to the board.  From these prescriptive articles, it was found that the board of 
directors in China was chiefly charged with the implementation of 
shareholders’ resolutions and was not in the center of corporate 
management. 60   Therefore, the legal setting in China was “shareholders 
centralism” rather than “board centralism” and should be distinguished from 
that of other countries.  
Another important aspect that sets the Chinese board apart from other 
jurisdictions is the legal representative system.  In many jurisdictions, the 
function of externally representing the company in dealings with third 
parties was achieved by the board of directors collegially, which in turn 
could authorize one or more directors to represent the company on 
occasions at discretion.  In the UK, the board as a whole acted as the 
external representative of the company,61 and might delegate any of their 
powers to any managing director as they considered desirable.62  In the U.S., 
the board of directors collectively was thought of as the primary agent with 
powers as extensively as the objects and purposes of the corporation 
required.63  In theory, every director was entitled to represent the company 
externally. 64   In Germany, the power of externally representing the 
corporation was given to the management board collegially, and the articles 
of incorporation or internal management (or job) allocations could entrust 
individual members to execute certain specific managerial functions.65  In 
Japan, the function of externally representing the company was fulfilled by 
the representative director system ( or daihyō torishimariyaku)66 
  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Chenxia Shi, What Matters in the Governance of the Board?—A Comparative 
Perspective, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. L 1, 14 (2004).   
 61. See K. L. ALEX LAU, A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE BOARDS OF 
DIRECTORS IN MAINLAND PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND HONG KONG 8 (2005). 
 62. See Companies Act ,1985, c. 6, tbl. A, art. 72 (Eng.). 
 63. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 6, at 453. 
 64. See Gan Peizhong, Gongsi Daili Zhidu Lunlüe [Analysis of the Company Agency 
System], 6 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE LEGAL SCI.] 71, 72 (1997). 
 65. See JEAN J. DU PLESSIS ET AL., GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 50-51 (2007). 
 66. Andreas Moerke & Harald Dolles, Corporate Governance in Multinational 
Corporations During Turbulent Times—Cases from the Automotive Industry 17 (Deutsches 
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after the Reform of Commercial Code in 1950.  The board, by its resolution, 
could designate one or more directors as the representative director of the 
company, and a company could appoint several representative directors at 
the same time to represent the company separately.67  In sum, the law in 
advanced economies usually assigned the board to represent the company 
collectively.  Flexibilities were provided so that the particular director and 
the scope of authority to represent the company could be determined by 
internal corporate decisions.68  In this regard, the legal representative system 
in China was extraordinary, due to its singular and statutory nature.  Under 
the Chinese system, the legal representative was a natural person authorized 
either by law or the articles of association of a company to act on behalf of 
and to bind the company.69  Only one director could be appointed statutorily 
as the legal representative and had the right to conduct business with 
outsiders on behalf of the company, even if there were several directors in 
the company.  The purview of the legal representative was stipulated by the 
laws, leaving no room for corporate autonomy to step in.  So, the flexible 
board representation and delegation system in other countries was replaced 
by the one–person and stereotyped legal representative system in China that 
should be distinguished from other jurisdictions.  In general, the board 
system established in this period was featured with Chinese characteristics 
in the sense that on one hand, the board of directors was inferior to the 
shareholders’ general meeting; but on the other hand, within the limited 
powers of the board, the legal representative, by controlling the power to 
conduct external transactions with third parties on behalf of the company, 
dominated a substantial portion of them.  
D. Rationale for the Uncommon Legal Settings 
The Chinese–style legal settings as to the board of directors should be 
read in the socio–economic context at that time.  Above all, abandoning 
board centralism did not mean that Chinese policymakers were not aware of 
the international prevalence of this trend in the drafting of company laws in 
the early 1990s.  In fact, they were very hesitant to empower the board, as 
could be seen by the deviations between JCRO and CL 1993.  Although it 
Institut Für Japanstudien, Working Paper No. 04/3, 2004), available at http://cosmic.rrz.uni-
hamburg.de/webcat/hwwa/edok05/f10908g/WP04-03.pdf. 
67. See SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.] art. 261 (Japan). 
68. See Yang Ji, Zhongguo Gufen Gongsi Fading Dabiaoren Zhidu De Cunfei [The 
Maintanence or Abolition of the Legal Representative System in Chinese Joint Stock 
Corporations], in ZHUANXING ZHONG DE GONGSIFA DE XIANDAIHUA [MODERNIZING 
COMPANY LAW IN TRANSFORMATION] 137 (Wang Baoshu ed., 2006).  
69. See Minfa Tongze, Diliujie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu 
Weiyuanhui [General Principles of Civil Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 
Nat’l People’s Congress, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Apr. 12, 1986), art. 38 (China) [hereinafter 
GPCL].  
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was clearly stated in the former that the board of directors was the standing 
corporate authority, 70  this expression was removed in the latter and 
substituted with the provision that the general assembly was the corporate 
authority.71  This change signaled the truth: that the transferring of powers 
from the board to the shareholders’ general meeting was deliberate and 
purposeful.  Generally speaking, the powerlessness of the board reflected 
the fact that the government did not have full confidence in this corporate 
organ due to a number of reasons.  
First, empowerment of the board did not fit into the need for the 
protection of state–owned assets.  Undeniably, corporate legislative 
movements in the early 1990s were to facilitate the establishment of a 
modern enterprise system in state–owned enterprises (“SOEs”).  As the 
most important feature, state–owned assets took up the vast majority of the 
total assets of SOEs, and protection of these assets was one of the major 
concerns during the law drafting process.72  Legal arrangements for the 
board of directors, especially the range of its rights and powers, should also 
serve the purpose of transforming SOEs into modern enterprises and should 
not conflict with the protection with state–owned assets.  If the board 
centralism model utilized in other countries were adopted by China, the 
Chinese board would have the final decision–making powers on the vast 
majority of corporate matters and become the corporate organ, which, at 
least in law, actually directed the SOEs.  However, such arrangements were 
not desirable in the Chinese context, because it implied that hundreds of 
billions of state–owned assets would be in the hands of the board.  In so 
doing, the board might hold discretion to sell, or even dispose of, state–
owned assets where such a decision was thought to accord with the business 
strategies of the company.  Regardless of whether such business behaviors 
would benefit the incorporated SOEs or not, the direct result of them would 
have been the loss of state–owned assets, or reduction of the total quantity 
of state–owned assets in the whole economy, which might eventually 
threaten the cornerstone of socialism, where public ownership dominated by 
state ownership should account for the majority position of the whole 
economy.73  Furthermore, it would also open the door for misappropriation 
and encroachment of state–owned assets by the directors.  Although ex post
70. See JCRO, at art. 52. 
71. See CL 1993, at art. 112. 
72. See Ma Zhen-Jiang, Goujian Dongshihui Zhongxin Zhuyi De Gongsi Faren Zhili 
Jiegou [Establishing Corporate Governance Structure Centered with Board of Directors], 2
DONGBEI SHIDA XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. NORTHEAST NORMAL UNIV. (PHIL.
& SOC. SCI)] 75, 77 (2009). 
73. Guanyu Jianli Shenhuizhuyi Shichangjingji Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de Jueding 
[Decision on Some Issues Regarding the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic 
System] (promulgated by 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 14th Session of the Standing Comm. of 
the Chinese Communist Party, Nov. 14, 1993, effective Nov. 14, 1993), arts. 8-9 [hereinafter 
DSIRESMES]. 
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administrative and judicial actions to correct these misbehaviors made 
disgorgement likely, these actions could be ineffective, incomplete, or even, 
in some cases, fruitless.  The disadvantages of ex post actions to curb 
directors’ misbehaviors rendered the empowerment of the board 
inappropriate in China.  In this regard, to put state–owned assets in the 
hands of the managing directors would possibly not be in line with the 
sanctity of public property, on which there was an emphasis in a socialist 
economy like China.74  If board centralism was not introduced, this evil 
door would be closed, or at least not open so widely because the board was 
not at the power center of dealing with state–owned assets.  Hence, 
empowerment of the board of directors was not regarded as advantageous.  
Instead, it was thought safer to confine the rights and powers of the board to 
avoid any trouble.  
Second, the witnessed tension between empowerment of the board of 
directors and the appropriate constraints over them in developed countries 
also discouraged the establishment of a powerful board.  Obviously, if board 
centralism was set up as the general principle, then the law had to be 
concerned with providing a framework of rules which constrained the 
potential abuse of powers by directors.  Unfortunately, the right balance 
between these two ends was not struck in an appropriate manner even in 
advanced economies with hundreds of years of corporate law practice.  
Actually, this had been an age–old problem which was constantly revisited 
by generations of rule makers, who usually changed company law in order 
to address the last corporate scandal rather than successfully identify where 
the next risk would come from.75  And in the years before the drafting of CL 
1993, the defects of board centralism were gradually exposed by the abuse 
of powers of directors case by case in other jurisdictions.  To remedy the 
deficiencies reflected, the board centralism model, though not abolished, 
was being modified by setting up more checks and balances in corporate 
governance, such as interference of institutional shareholders in insider 
control, employee participation in corporate governance, and supervision of 
banks and other financial institutions. 76   However, the hot debates that 
drastically increased from 1980s onwards still did not have any definite 
conclusions by the early 1990s.  In the UK, the significant Cadbury Report 
came out in 1992, with the longest chapter discussing various aspects of the 
74. See XIANFA art. 12 (1982) (China); XIANFA art. 12 (1993) (China). 
75. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 370; Gordon Walker, Corporate Governance in 
East Asia: Prospects for Reform, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ASIA-PACIFIC 
CRITIQUE 589-90 (Low Chee Keong ed., 2002). 
76. See Zhu Bo–Yu, Gongsi Faren Zhili Jiegou De Lishi Yanbian Ji Dianxing Moshi 
[The Historical Evolution and the Typical Model of Corporate Governance Structure], 6 
SHANDONG DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. SHANDONG UNIV. (SOC. SCI.)] 
66, 69-70 (2001). 
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board,77 but the feasibility and impact of this report was yet to be seen at 
that time.  And in the U.S. (the origin of the debates on corporate 
governance movements), although corporate law amendments had taken 
place in some of the states,78 a nationwide consensus— a product of years of 
development and preparation—was still on its way. 79   Against the 
background that the board centralism model in other countries was facing 
unprecedented challenges, it would be understandable that China did not 
adopt this model immediately since this model might or might not be 
retained in the near future in advanced economies.  Particularly, as a 
country where the modern corporate system was only in place for a few 
years and corporatization was still in its infancy, it would have been too 
demanding for China to foresee the future of the retaining but modified 
board centralism. 80   Taking all these elements into consideration, a 
conservative but safe measure was not to strengthen, but to weaken the role 
of the board of directors. 
In addition, the legal representative system was a continuation of the 
previous factory manager responsibility system in SOEs.  In the 1980s, the 
ambiguous responsibility systems were identified as one of the roots of the 
low efficiency of SOEs.  To change this vague status, the simplest method 
was to center all the responsibilities on one person.  And as a necessary 
condition for the establishment of this mechanism, all powers should also be 
concentrated on one person.  The product of this idea was the factory 
manager responsibility system, which was pushed forward to the frontier of 
SOE reforms swiftly during the whole of the 1980s.  Under this system, 
powers and responsibilities in the management of SOEs were all centered in 
one person, i.e. the factory manager.  By occupying the central position in 
the firm, this leader was then the single head of the enterprise and 
responsible for the whole system of production, operation and 
77. See COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & GEE & CO.,
LTD. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(1992) [hereinafter FINANCIAL ASPECTS]. 
78. In 1983, Pennsylvania was the first state that passed a constituency statute which 
permitted the exercise of fiduciary duties with regard to the effects on stakeholders for the 
sake of the modification of board centralism.  This was followed by twenty-eight other states 
over the next decade.  See Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: 
Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
109, 123 (2004). 
79. The major report from the American Law Institute, namely PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, which had a standing on the 
legal functions, powers and duties of the board of directors, was published in 1994, one year 
after the promulgation of CL 1993.  See generally A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994). 
80. For an analysis of the modified board centralism model, see Bo–Yu, supra note 
76, at 70. 
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management.81  As part of the major management powers of the company, 
the power to represent the company was also exclusively given to the 
factory manager. 82   Later, this kind of representation was legitimately 
confirmed as the legal representative system in GPCL,83 which designated 
one person to enjoy the unique power to represent the company externally. 
Owing to the broad scope of application of this piece of basic law, the 
legal representative system was, at this time, made applicable to all legal 
entities in China in addition to SOEs.  Corporate legislation in the early 
1990s went on with this special representation system, which reflected the 
fact that Chinese policymakers did not completely emancipate from the old 
system that emphasized the leading role of a single head in the power 
structure of corporate management and operation.  Although the 
introduction of a board of directors under CL 1993 made collective exercise 
of corporate management powers a necessary requirement, with the 
maintenance of the legal representative system, power concentration in one 
person was maintained to a large extent.  Under the legal arrangement of 
this Law, one single board member attained a legal status superior to that of 
other directors due to the unique and extensive powers in representing the 
company externally.  In so doing, a substantive amount of power of the 
board was concentrated on a single person, which partially mirrored the old 
practice.  Possibly, apart from the inertial thinking about enterprise 
management, the preservation of the idea of a single leader was to reduce 
the pain in the reform process.  Under this legal setting, the former factory 
manager could be easily transformed into the legal representative of the 
company, and therefore his central position in the enterprise, by 
monopolizing the power to deal with external business with third parties, 
was sustained. 84   In short, the legal representative system reflected the 
endurance of the old factory manager responsibility system and the 
continuity of the systems before and after reform.  
81. See Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiyefa [Law of Industrial Enterprises Owned 
by the Entire People] (promulgated by 1st Mtg. Nat’l People’s Cong. [Diqijie Quanguo 
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Diyici Huiyi], Apr. 13, 1988, effective Aug. 1, 1988) art. 45 (China).  
82. See Liu Jing-wei, Lun Fading Daibiaoren [On Legal Representative], 2 GUIZHOU 
DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. GUIZHOU UNIV. (SOCIAL SCIENCE)] 13, 17-19 
(2002); LIU JINGWEI, DANGDAI ZHONGGUO MINSHI LIFA WENTI [ISSUES OF CIVIL 
LEGISLATIONS IN MODERN CHINA] 70-73 (2005). 
83. GPCL, at art. 38 
84. See Xu Yanbing, Lun Fading Daibiaoren Zhidu De Biduan Jiqi Wanshan [On 
the Drawbacks and Improvement of the Legal Representative System], in GONGSI ZHILI:
GUOJI JIEJIAN YU ZHIDU SHEJI [CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE AND 
INSTITUTION DESIGN] 1 (Bintian Daodai & Gu Gongyun eds., 2005). 
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II. ACTIONS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
A. Efforts to Promote the Board 
The limited legal position of the board of directors in black letter law did 
not necessarily mean that the board was powerless in reality.  According to 
two surveys of the companies listed on the two domestic stock exchanges, 
the Chinese board had a much more important role in the governance of 
many listed companies than prescribed in the laws.  In a survey of the 
companies listed in Shanghai, 71.7% of the interviewed companies thought 
that the board of directors was the key to the promotion of corporate 
efficiency and competitiveness, and 50.3% of them chose the board of 
directors as the proper organ to be responsible for the drafting of corporate 
development strategies. 85   Another survey of the companies listed in 
Shenzhen found that 42% of the boards of directors in the investigated 
companies had relatively broad investment decision–making powers, and 
these companies had better corporate performance.86  This implied that a 
more powerful board could contribute to superior corporate performance.87
Furthermore, with the continuous authority expansion of the board, the 
practical position of the monopolistic legal representative in corporate 
governance was also upgrading.  Without proper checks and balances, this 
key player in the company might abuse the exclusive powers in dealing with 
third parties.  Responsive to the potential problems associated with the 
gradual empowerment of the board in practice, more laws and rules 
followed.  Among them, the Guidelines for the Articles of Association of 
Listed Companies 1997 (“GAALC 1997”) and Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies (“CCGLC”) stood out.  These rules, 
generally speaking, dealt with issues regarding two layers of the board 
system: the board as a whole and the individual board members.  These 
aspects of the reform are now reviewed in turn.  
85. Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo [Shanghai Stock Exchange], Shangshi Gongsi 
Zhili Wenjuan Diaocha JieguoYu Fenxi [Results and Analysis of the Survey of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies], 12 SHANGSHI GONGSI [LISTED COMPANIES] 11, 25 
(2000). 
86. See He Weidong, Shenjiaosuo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhuangkuang Diaocha 
Fenxi Baogao [Report on the Survey of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange], ZHENGQUAN RIBAO [SEC. DAILY], Dec. 18, 2003. 
87. The value orientation of the board of directors is efficiency.  A corporate power 
structure centralized on the board is advantageous to quick response to the ever–changing 
market.  See Huang Zikai, Dongshihui De Zhidu Jiazhi: Gongsi Liyi [Institutional Value of 
the Board of Directors: Corporate Interests], 3 ZHEJIANGSHENG ZHENGFA GUANLI GANBU 
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. ZHEJIANG C. POL. & L.] 22 (2001).  Therefore, the gap between law 
and practice of the Chinese board could be understood in the sense that, with the deepening 
of market–oriented reform, the enterprise has to be more swiftly responsive to market 
changes, and therefore a centralized board emerges. 
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1. Confirming Powers of the Board 
As a response to its rising status in reality, more powers were conferred 
on the board of directors in laws and rules, such as formulating the listing 
plan of securities; the plan for major mergers and stock repurchases; the 
revision of the articles of association; deciding on security matters under the 
authorization of the shareholders’ general meeting; the reward and 
punishment issues of senior management; managing the disclosure of 
corporate information; putting forward to the shareholders’ general meeting 
the proposal relating to the appointment or removal of accounting firms;88
and interpreting the articles of association of the company.89  The board also 
enjoyed the discretion of whether to include the proposal submitted by 
shareholders in the agenda of the general meeting90 and had the power of 
using proxy solicitation in the shareholders’ general meeting.91  The board 
was further granted power to exercise any rights authorized by the 
shareholders’ general meeting.92
2. Building up Checks and Balances Within the Board  
To establish a more appropriate system of power distributions, more 
checks and balances were built within the board.  First, in spite of the 
maintenance of powers of the chairperson,93 some restrictions were imposed 
on the collective authorization of powers on the chairperson by the board.94
Some procedural remedies were also given where the chairperson, as the 
legal representative, failed to perform his duties.95  Second, some rules were 
provided to avoid the undue influence of an interested director, such as 
abstention in the voting procedure96 or withdrawal from a board meeting.97
88. See Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin [Guidelines for the Articles of 
Association of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the Securities and Futures Commission 
No. 16, Dec. 16, 1997, effective Dec. 16, 1997), art. 94 [hereinafter GAALC 1997]. 
89. See Id. at art. 194. 
90. See Id. at art. 59. 
91. See Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jan. 7, 2002, 
effective Jan. 7, 2002) art. 10 (China), [hereinafter CCGLC]; Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui 
Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohu De Ruogan [Guiding Provisions on Strengthening the 
Protection of the Rights and Interests of General Public Shareholders], (promulgated Dec. 7, 
2004, effective Dec. 7, 2004) art. 1(3) (China) [hereinafter PSPRIGPS]. 
92. See CCGLC, at art. 7. 
93. See GAALC 1997, at art. 99. 
94. See CCGLC, at art. 48. 
95. See Qiye Faren Fading Daibiaoren Dengji Guanli Guiding (99 Xiuding) 
[Provisions for the Management of Registration of Legal Representative in Enterprises as 
Legal Persons (1999 Revision)] (promulgated by Nat’l Admin. Bureau of Indus. & 
Commerce, June 23, 1999, effective June 23, 1999) art. 7 (China). 
96. See GAALC 1997, at art. 83; Guanyu Shangshi Gongsi Wei Taren Tigong 
Danbiao Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi [Circular on Issues Concerning Providing Guarantees 
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Third, certain matters were required to be approved by the board of 
directors by a special resolution.98  Fourth, committed structures, such as 
corporate strategy committee, audit committee, nominating committee, and 
remuneration committee were developed by the board.99  Fifth, separation 
between the board and senior management was also emphasized so that the 
board could be more independent in monitoring the management team.  The 
number of directors who also acted as the managers, vice managers, or other 
senior management staff was set as not exceeding half of the total 
directors. 100   In answering the increasing adoption of chief executive 
officers  in China,101 division between the chairperson of the board and the 
chief executive was highly recommended.102
3. Strengthening the Duties of Directors 
Due to the weaknesses in CL 1993,103 subsequent changes were made to 
revolutionize duties of directors in two aspects.  First, the former duty of 
loyalty was further elaborated by more specific prohibitive acts, such as: not 
exercising their powers beyond their scope of duties, not using inside 
information to reap benefits for themselves or others, not availing 
themselves or others of invading or accepting business opportunities of the 
company, not accepting the commission associated with the transaction with 
the company without informed approval of the shareholders’ general 
meeting,104 and not suspending or delaying a general meeting which might 
for Third Party of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory 
Comm., June 6, 2000, effective June 6, 2000) art. 5 (China). 
97. See CCGLC, at art. 71. 
98. See Guanyu Guifan Shangshi Gongsi Yu Guanlianfang Zijin Wanglai Ji 
Shangshi Gongsi Duiwai Danbao Ruogan Wenti De Tongzhi [Circular on Several Issues 
Concerning the Regulation of Financial Transactions Between Listed Companies and 
Affiliated Parties and External Guarantees of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China 
Securities Regulatory Comm., Jan. 7, 2004, effective Jan. 7, 2004) art. 2(3) (China) 
[hereinafter Circular on Several Issues Concerning the Regulation of Financial Transactions 
between Listed Companies and Affiliated Parties and External Guarantees of Listed 
Companies]; Guanyu Guifan Shangshi Gongsi Shiji Kongzhiquan Zhuanyi Xingwei 
Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi [Circular on Regulating the Transfer of Actual Control over 
Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Comm., Jan. 7, 2004, 
effective Jan.7, 2004) art. 3 (China). 
99. See CCGLC, at arts. 52-58. 
100. See GAALC 1997, at art. 118. 
101. See, e.g., Han Qi, Cong Geren Yezhu Dao CEO [From Individual Entrepreneur 
to CEO], 5 GUAN LI XIAN DAI HUA 20, 24 (2001) (China). 
102. See Guanyu Shenhua Daxing Qiye Jituan Shidian Gongzuo Yijian De Tongzhi 
[Opinions on Deepening the Pilot Reforms in Large Enterprise Groups] (promulgated by St. 
Council, Apr. 29, 1997, effective Apr. 29, 1997) art. 2(3) (China). 
103. See Mary L. Riley, Directors’ Liability in PRC Companies, 6(8) INT’L COMPANY 
& COMMERCIAL L.REV. 292 (1995). 
104. See GAALC 1997, at art. 80. 
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pass a resolution against them.105  And the listed companies were allowed to 
impose more specific duties on the directors where they thought fit.106
Second, two new kinds of duties, the duty of care and duty of good faith, 
were established for board members.  Directors were required to exercise 
the rights conferred by the company “carefully, earnestly, and diligently.”107
Listed companies were encouraged to lay down specific measures as to the 
effective implementation of “the duty of good faith.”108  The content of 
these new duties was also outlined by listing a number of specific 
prescriptions, such as reading the business and financial reports of the listed 
companies carefully and keeping abreast of the business operation and 
management of the company; exercising the rights of management and 
disposal conferred by the company in person without the manipulation of 
others;109 ensuring adequate time and energy for the performance of their 
duties;110 attending the board meeting in a diligent and responsible manner 
and expressing clearly their opinions on the topics discussed; 111  strictly 
fulfilling the undertakings they made publicly; 112  attending the relevant 
training to learn more about their rights, obligations, and duties; 
familiarizing themselves with relevant laws and regulations; and mastering 
relevant knowledge necessary for acting as directors.113  It was even stated 
that all directors in a listed company bore the duty of good faith for the 
regular convening of the shareholders’ general meeting.114
4. Enhancing the Accountability of Directors 
A number of devices were enacted in this period to reinforce the 
accountability of directors.  First of all, the board may propose the 
shareholders’ general meeting to dismiss a director who failed to attend two 
105. See Shangshi Gongsi Gudong Dahui Guifan Yijian (1998 Nian) [Regulatory 
Opinions on the Shareholders’ General Meeting of Listed Companies (1998)] (promulgated 
by China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Feb. 20, 1998, effective Feb. 20, 1998) art. 15 (China) 
[hereinafter ROSGMLC 1998)]. 
106. See GAALC 1997, at art. 80. 
107. See Id. at art. 81. 
108. See Guanyu Dui Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Jinxing Fudao De Tongzhi 
[Circular on Assistance for Companies Offering Public Shares] (promulgated by the China 
Securities Regulatory Comm. [Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Sep. 5, 
1995, effective Sep. 5, 1995) art. 5 (China). 
109. See GAALC 1997, at art. 81. 
110. See CCGLC, at art. 34. 
111. See Id. at art. 35. 
112. See Id. at art. 36. 
113. See Id. at art. 37. 
114. See Shangshi Gongsi Gudong Dahui Guifan Yijian (2000 Nian Xiuding) 
[Regulatory Opinions on the Shareholders’ General Meeting of Listed Companies (2000 
Revised ed.)], promulgated by China Sec. Reg. Comm’n [Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu 
Guanli Weiyuanhui], May 18, 2000, effective May 18, 2000) art. 2 (China) [hereinafter 
ROSGMLC 2000]. 
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consecutive board meetings without authorizing other directors to represent 
him/her. 115   In addition, all directors of the listed company would be 
charged with joint and several liabilities in certain cases.116  Civil liabilities 
of the directors were further consolidated in GAALC 1997 and judicial 
interpretations by upholding lawsuits against directors.  Both the company 
and the shareholders could sue the company directors based on the articles 
of association.117  And shareholders, as clarified by judicial interpretations, 
were entitled to bring lawsuits against the resolution of the board of 
directors detrimental to their legal interests, 118  or against the directors 
directly where they engaged in misrepresentation of the company.119  For 
administrative liabilities, CSRC and the stock exchanges could impose 
sanctions on directors who did not duly perform their duties, such as 
reprimand, warning, fine, suspension, and banning from the market.120  The 
regulators might also instruct listed companies to remove incapable 
directors according to legal procedures in certain circumstances. 121  
Criminal liabilities of directors were also enhanced in a number of ways in 
Criminal Law 1997 (1997 ).122 
  
 115. See GAALC 1997, at art. 85. 
 116. See Circular on Several Issues Concerning the Regulation of Financial 
Transactions Between Listed Companies and Affiliated Parties and External Guarantees of 
Listed Companies, at art. 2; Zhengquanfa [Securities Law 1997] (promulgated by Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. [Quanguo Renda Changweihui], Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 
1, 1999) arts. 42, 63 (China) [hereinafter SL 1997]. 
 117. See GAALC 1997, at art. 10. 
 118. Guanyu Zhou Zhengyi Zhuanggao Pudong Fazhan Yinhang Yaoqiu Chexiao 
Zengfa Xingu Yi’an Deng Yilei Jiufen De Tousu Yingfou Shouli De Fuhan [Circular 
Regarding the Lawsuit by Zhou Zhengyi Against Pudong Development Bank Seeking to 
Withdraw the Resolution of Issuance of Additional Shares by Supreme People’s Court] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan], Nov. 21, 2002, effective 
Nov. 21, 2002) (China) [hereinafter Zhengyi Lawsuit]. 
 119. See Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa De Minshi 
Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi [Circular on the Relevant Issues 
Concerning the Acceptance of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Caused by Misrepresentations in the 
Securities Markets] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan], Jan. 15, 
2002, effective Jan. 15, 2002) (China) [hereinafter Dispute Cases]; Guanyu Shenli 
Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa De Minshi Peichang Anjian De Ruogan 
Guiding [Provisions Governing the Adjudication of Civil Compensation Cases Based upon 
Misrepresentations in the Securities Markets] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. [Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan], Jan. 9, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2003) (China). 
 120. See Chenxia Shi & Hu Bin, China, in DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR 
CORPORATE FAULT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 115, 124-26 (Helen Anderson ed., 2008). 
 121. See Guanyu Tigao Shangshi Gongsi Zhiliang Yijian De Tongzhi [Opinions on 
Improving the Quality of Listed Companies] (promulgated by St. Council [Guowuyuan], 
Oct. 19, 2005, effective Oct. 19, 2005) art. 21 (China). 
 122. See Nian Xingfa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong. [Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui], Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) 
arts. 163, 165, 166, 169, 219, 271, 272 (China).  For an introspection of criminal liabilities of 
directors under Criminal Law 1997, see LI YANBING, SHANGSHI GONGSI GAOGUAN ZHIWU 
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5. Improving Incentive Mechanisms 
The incentive mechanisms of directors were also improved in two 
aspects.  First, to boost creative corporate management of directors in a 
risky market without exposing them to excessive liabilities, liability 
insurance was encouraged to be purchased for the directors after approval 
by the shareholders’ general meeting. 123   Second, to provide efficient 
managerial incentives by linking management compensation and long–term 
corporate performance together, equity–based incentive schemes were 
reintroduced.124  At the turn of the new century, the establishment of long–
term equity incentives in SOEs was referred to as one of several policies 
concerning SOE reform125 and building up such mechanisms was later fully 
implemented in target SOEs.126   As a result of the orientation of these 
policies, the number of listed companies experimenting long–term equity–
based incentive packages kept increasing.  By the end of 2004, there had 
been 149 A–share companies that implemented stock incentive plans in a 
variety of manners.127
FANZUI WENTI YANJIU [THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY THE 
DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENTS OF LISTED COMPANIES] 150-53 (2006). 
123. See CCGLC, at art. 49. 
124. As a matter of fact, stock–related incentivized pay arrangements could be traced 
back to corporate laws prior to the establishment of New China.  See WANG DANRU, QIYE 
ZUZHI [ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATIONS] 206 (1936).  And some preliminary attempts were tried 
in the 1980s to reform the compensation system.  See Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, Executive 
Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from 
Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL 
CHANGE 945, 951-954 (2006). 
125. Guanyu Guoyou Qiye Gaige He Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti De Jueding 
[Decision on the Major Issues regarding SOE Reform and Development] (promulgated by 
the Central Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party [Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang 
Weiyuanhui], Sep. 22, 1999, effective Sep. 22, 1999) art. 11 (China); Guoyou Dazhongxing 
Qiye Jianli Xiandai Qiye Zhidu He Jiaqiang Guanli De Jiben Guifan (Shixing) [Basic Rules 
of the Establishment of Modern Enterprise System and the Strengthening of Management in 
State-owned Large-and-Medium Size Enterprises (Provisional)], (promulgated by the Gen. 
Office of the St. Council [Guowuyuan Bangongting], Sep. 28, 2000, effective Sep. 28, 2000) 
art. 4(27) (China); Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa 
[Provisional Measures for Performance Evaluation of Leaders of Central Enterprises], 
(promulgated by the St. Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n [Guoyou Zichan 
Jiangu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Dec. 28, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) (China). 
126. Guanyu Guoyou Gaoxin Jishu Qiye Kaizhan Guquan Jili Shidian Gongzuo De 
Zhidao Yijian [Guidelines for the Experiment of Developing Equity Incentive Mechanisms 
in State-owned High-tech Enterprises] (promulgated by the General Office of the State 
Council [Guowuyuan Bangongting], Sep. 17, 2002, effective Sep. 17, 2002) (China). 
127. See CAO YANG, ZHONGGUO SHANGSHI GONGSI GAOGUANCENG GUQUAN JILI 
SHISHI XIAOGUO YANJIU [STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE 
STOCK INCENTIVES BY CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES] 75 (2008). 
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B. Constant Mixing and Internalization  
The adjusted board system in China at this stage continued to manifest 
varied characteristics when compared with its equivalents in other countries.  
On one hand, U.S. norms of the board were gradually infiltrated into the 
Chinese context.  This was initially visible by the adoption of committee 
structures (the audit, compensation, and nomination committees) in China, 
which were better developed in U.S. public companies than in other 
countries.128  In addition, liability insurance for directors also originated 
from the U.S., where both jurisprudence from the courts and legislatures of 
the state dated from the 1940s and 1950s upheld the protection of directors 
from personal liability for business decisions.129  Similar insurance polices 
were less developed in other countries (the UK), or without statutory 
backup (Germany), or had a shorter history (Japan).130  Utilizing liability 
insurance for directors in China indicated an inclination towards adopting a 
more U.S.–based practice.  Moreover, the promotion of equity–based, 
performance–oriented pay and award at the turn of the century was also a 
signal that the Chinese board increasingly emulated the American model.  
As a matter of fact, the contrast with incentive mechanisms in developed 
countries was stark in the sense that stock options and other incentivized 
pay with a long–term orientation were only emphasized in the U.S. at that 
time.131  In other common law countries, such as the UK, variable pay of 
this kind was a less important component of the remuneration package.132
And in civil law countries, like Germany, equity–based remuneration like 
stock options was of only negligible importance.133   Japanese law even 
effectively precluded firms from using equity–based schemes like stock 
options as part of the compensation package for top management prior to 
128. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 5-15
(2004). 
129. See Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers 
Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 BUS.
L. 573, 574 (1996). 
130. Shi Tongling & Liu Zhengyu, Gongsi Dongshi Zeren Baoxian Falv Wenti Yanjiu 
[On Legal Issues of Company Directors Liability Insurance], 3 LIAONING SHIZHUAN XUEBAO 
(SHEHUI KEXUEBAN) [J. LIAONING TEACHERS COLL. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 137 (2007). 
131. After the enactment of the 1950 Revenue Act, the use of stock options has 
continued to skyrocket in the U.S. to earn a major share of managerial pay as a response to 
the favorable tax consideration.  See Symposium, Current Issues in Executive Compensation,
3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 519, 522 (2007). 
132. See Brian R. Cheffins & Randell S. Thomas, The Globalization 
(Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 233, 241-42 (2004). 
133. Stefan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 967 (Klaus J. 
Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge eds., 1998). 
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1997,134 and qualifications and experiences of the directors were the more 
important factors that impacted their incomes.135  The shift towards equity–
based incentive plans in China constituted a significant move to the 
American model. 
On the other hand, philosophies of other countries continued to shape the 
board system in China.  The emphasis on the separation of chairperson and 
CEO was an example where China did not imitate the U.S. model.  In the 
U.S., the combined position of board chairperson and CEO was a universal 
part of boardroom structure, and splitting these two roles received only 
modest support from listed companies.136  The idea of separating the roles 
of the chairperson and the CEO of the board was taken from other business 
cultures, particularly Europe.  In the UK and continental European 
countries, the roles of chair and chief executive were typically divided.137
For example, in the UK, the Cadbury report recommended that there be a 
clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of a company, and 
the two roles should not be combined in one person.138  Empirical evidence 
also revealed that by the mid–1990s, only about one–third of the largest 
publicly traded companies had a combined chairperson and CEO in the 
UK. 139   And in the two–tier board systems in continental European 
countries, such as Germany, the separation of the positions of board 
chairperson and CEO was also common. 140   It was noticeable that the 
division of chairperson and CEO in China’s listed companies was more 
inspired by the European traditions than that of the U.S.  
The overall power structure of the board of directors in China, however, 
was not altered because of these reform measures.  It was obvious that the 
134. See Hideaki Kiyoshi Kato, Mi Luo & James Schallheim, An Empirical 
Examination of the Costs and Benefits of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from Japan, 78
J. FIN. ECONOMIES 435, 436 (2005). Sun Li, GONGSI ZHILI JIEGOU DE GUOJI BIJIAO: RIBEN 
QISHI [OF IMPROVING CORPORATE MANAGEMENT: THE ENLIGHTENMENT FROM JAPAN] 65 
(2008). 
 135. See Kenji Hall, Shouxi Zhixingguan Xinchou: Qianwan Bie Cong Riben 
Zhao Da’an [Remunerations of CEOs: Don’t Seek Answers from Japan], BW
ZHONGWENWANG [BWCHINESE.COM] (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.bwchinese.com/ 
article/elite_platform/2009-09/458.html.
136. See GREGORY FRANCESCO MAASSEN, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS: A STUDY ON THE FORMAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
CONVERGENCE OF ONE–TIER AND TWO–TIER CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NETHERLANDS 179 (3d ed.
2002) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS], available at 
http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/8028/Maassen_9789090125916.pdf. 
137. See RALPH D. WARD, SAVING THE CORPORATE BOARD: WHY BOARDS FAIL AND 
HOW TO FIX THEM 17 (2003). 
138. See FINANCIAL ASPECTS, supra note 77, at 4.9. 
139. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 189 (1995). 
140. See Klaus J. Hopt and Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe - Recent 
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France and Italy, 1 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 135, 160-61 (2004). 
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distinctive basis of the Chinese board was retained.  First, although more 
powers were authorized for the board of directors by the rules of CSRC, the 
board continued to be a corporate organ inferior to the general assembly.  
The legal division as to the power allocation between the shareholders’ 
general meeting and the board of directors was kept within these rules.  The 
former carried forward the decisive power as to the business policies and 
investment plans,141 whilst the latter was only granted power to develop 
business plans and investment programs.142  The array of plans and schemes 
made by the board of directors was constantly subject to the approval of the 
shareholders’ general meeting,143 and it was accentuated that the board of 
directors should be accountable to the shareholders’ general meeting. 144
Also, although a niche was open for the board of directors to exercise 
powers other than those stipulated in the laws, regulations, and articles of 
association, such empowerment should first gain the approval of the 
shareholders’ general meeting.145  So the scope of powers of the board of 
directors remained at the mercy of the general assembly; the general power 
allocation between the general assembly and the board of directors did not 
move from shareholders centralism to board centralism.  
Second, there were not any substantive changes regarding the legal 
representative system even with the increasing checks and balances on the 
board.  CCGLC did not breathe a word about the legal representative 
system, and GAALC 1997 only referred to this system when necessary 
without changing the legal arrangements provided by CL 1993.  The legal 
representative continued to be the one and only person who could represent 
the company in dealing with third parties, and in bringing and defending 
lawsuits in the court and in signing contracts on behalf of the company.  
Therefore, the general structure of power allocation regarding the board of 
directors was not changed by the improvements made during this period. 
Apart from the exceptions to these structural arrangements, some of the 
new reform initiatives also demonstrated the Chinese–style legal settings 
since foreign norms and institutions were filtered in a particular way.  This 
was evident from the approach to reinforcing the duties of directors, which 
describes very specific acts for the directors without providing a case law 
basis.  At this stage, whatever was the former duty of loyalty or the newly 
incorporated duty of care and duty of good faith, the Chinese approach was 
distinct both from civil law and common law jurisdictions.  Civil law 
countries like Germany or Japan did not go as far as Chinese laws to set out 
so much detailed content of the duties of directors.  In Germany, the duties 
of directors were broadly stipulated, and only a few specific prohibitions 
141. See GAALC 1997, at art. 42 (1). 
142. See Id. at art. 94 (3). 
143. See Id. at arts. 42, 94. 
144. See CCGLC, at art. 42. 
145. See GAALC 1997, at art. 94; CCGLC, at art. 7. 
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were imposed on directors, such as non–competition restraints and 
regulations on self–dealing.146  And Japanese law had the same feature in 
the sense that fewer than a dozen specific prohibitions were given to 
elaborate on the duties of directors, such as non–competition with the 
company, constraints on self–dealing, and conscientious awareness in 
determining the remuneration of directors.147  Chinese law, nevertheless, 
provided more sub–duties than these two countries.  Setting aside the 
prohibitive acts stipulated in other countries, it even elucidated several 
positive behaviors for directors, such as keeping abreast of the business 
operation and management of the company.148  On the other hand, because 
the case law regime that laid down the foundation of duties of directors was 
absent in China, Chinese law stood in sharp contrast to common law 
countries. 149   The several types of duties of directors in common law 
countries were all consolidated by the vast sea of case law.  For example, in 
the UK, the duty of loyalty was initially developed by the court of equity 
and was based on fiduciary principles.  This duty was usually treated as an 
equitable duty analogous to a trustee.  The duty of care required from a 
director had a common law basis and rested on the principle of the law of 
negligence.150  It was noteworthy that the duties of directors were mostly 
found in the existing equitable and common law principles, both of which 
were composed of the case law system in the UK.151  And in the U.S., 
although the trend in the past several decades was increasing attempts to 
codify matters that previously had been left to doctrine,152 the concept of 
fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, could be 
understood only in the context of specific cases.  The broad and 
encompassing nature of fiduciary duties necessitated that the courts 
determine the boundaries of these obligations, and the case law system in 
the U.S. had developed into the foundation of these duties.153  In contrast, 
  
 146. See Rebecca Lee, Fiduciary Duty Without Equity: “Fiduciary Duties” of 
Directors Under the Revised Company Law of the PRC, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 897, 906-07 
(2007). 
 147. See Shishido, supra note 53, at 146-147. 
 148. See GAALC 1997, at art. 81. 
 149. See Lee, supra note 146, at 906-07, 910. 
 150. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 380. 
 151. There has been a long journey over the years to reduce the duties to statutory 
form in the UK.  See JOHN FARRAR, FARRAR’S COMPANY LAW 378 (1998).  Although the 
Companies Act 2006 has codified the general duties of directors, it is clearly stated that the 
statutory duties set out do not have the effect of replacing those rules within existing case 
law.  The case law rules and principles are allowed to develop thereafter and continue to be 
the legal basis for duties of directors.  See LE TALBOT, CRITICAL COMPANY LAW 181 (2008); 
Richard Nolan, Codifying Directors’ Duties: Was It Worth It? (Apr. 6, 2009) (paper 
delivered at the Faculty of Law, The Univ. of Hong Kong).  
 152. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 6, at 477. 
 153. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law 
Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Incomplete Law Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC 
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Chinese law did not have a case law system and failed to supply binding 
judicial decisions to uphold those statutory duties.154  It was submitted that, 
in terms of the duties of directors, Chinese law was suspended between civil 
law and common law systems, because it was more specific than the 
statutory provisions in civil law but more general than the case law in 
common law.  The duties of directors in China neither followed civil law 
countries nor common law regimes.155  They were unique and could hardly 
be categorized into one of the two major legal traditions. 
In sum, efforts made in this period did not modify the general legal 
framework of the board system in China, nor did it change the fusing but 
exclusive nature of Chinese law.156
C. Dysfunctions and Embedded Problems 
Legislative efforts at this stage clearly showed that Chinese policymakers 
discovered the weaknesses of the old laws and strived for the improvement 
of them piece by piece.  Unfortunately, a careful and cautious observation 
revealed that the results of endeavor did not match expectations, because the 
revised framework neither promoted the effectiveness of the board of 
directors nor efficiently deterred the misconduct of directors.  As a general 
piece of evidence, empirical research, which studied the correlation between 
the board of directors and corporate performance in companies listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (“SHSE”) from 1 January 1999 to 1 January 
2003, found that the board of directors in the sampled companies did not 
serve as the catalyst to enhance corporate performance, and the overall 
effectiveness of the board was not very satisfactory.157  As a more specific 
INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 
77, 77-78 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003). 
154. See S.H. Goo & Anne Carver, Low Structure, High Ambiguity: Selective 
Adaptation of International Norms of Corporate Governance Mechanisms in China, in
CHANGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN CHINA AND JAPAN: ADAPTATIONS OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN PRACTICES 206, 227-228 (Masao Nakamura ed., 2008). 
155. Actually, it has been concluded that the duties of directors under Chinese law are 
arrived at by piecing together the foreign mechanisms of both common law and civil law.  
See Yuhua Wei, Directors’ Duties under Chinese Law: A Comparative Review, 3 UNIV. NEW 
ENG. L.J. 31 (2006). 
156. The cases which showed that China learned both from common law and civil law 
countries, such as the committee structures, liability insurance, equity–based remuneration, 
and the separation of chairperson and CEO were only of the encouraging nature.  In contrast, 
those duties of directors, once adopted by listed companies, would have a binding effect.  
Hence, comparatively speaking, the ingredients of Chinese–style legal settings outstripped 
the transplanted foreign elements at this stage. 
157. XIAMEN DAXUE GUANLI XUEYUAN, XIAMEN ZHENGQUAN YOUXIAN GONGSI
[SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT OF XIAMEN UNIVERSITY, XIAMEN SECURITIES CO., LTD.], WOGUO
SHANGSHI GONGSI DONGSHIHUI YOUXIAOXING DE SHIZHENG YANJIU [EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES], 
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investigation, other research looked at the correlation between the frequency 
of board activities and corporate performance in companies listed on the 
two domestic stock exchanges from 1998 to 2001.  The board convened 
more board meetings and acted more frequently only after corporate 
performance declined or the company was in trouble.  And the increasingly 
frequent activities of the directors did not contribute much to the 
improvement of corporate performance, or, in some cases, went with the 
sharply falling corporate performance in the following year. 158   It was 
therefore perceived that Chinese board activities were passive and reactive 
rather than proactive and precautionary.  And there was a high degree of 
efficiency waste in board activities since the increase of board activities 
failed to promote better corporate performance.159  Furthermore, the large 
amount of regulations of CSRC and other market regulators also fell short 
in preventing the malfeasance of directors.  Astonishing cases, such as 
Qiong Minyuan ( ), where the chairperson of the board instigated the 
fabrication of false financial and accounting reports of the company, and 
Hongguang Industrial ( ), where the board of directors collectively 
acquiesced in the company’s falsification of the prospectus, proved that 
even with the growing numbers of rules, directors continued to commit 
malpractice in the manner that did not differ substantially from the previous 
period.160  
Causes of dysfunctions of the Chinese board were two–fold.  On one 
hand, the legal arrangement of director regulation failed to strike a right 
balance between corporate autonomy and legal intervention.  The 
tremendous freedom enjoyed by the board of directors in industrialized 
countries was substituted by rigid and inflexible legal rules in China.  An 
apparent point was the statutory arrangement for the predominant role of the 
chairperson on the board.  In advanced economies, the role of the 
chairperson of the board was unsupported by the law and depended entirely 
on the usage, consent, and best practice of the company.  In the UK, statute, 
the model memoranda and articles of association, and case law were 
concerned only with the chairperson in procedural terms, and a more 
substantive role for the chairperson was only recognized in the codes which 
were on a “comply or explain” basis and did not have binding powers.161  
The situation in the U.S. was quite similar, as both corporation statutes and 
  
SHANGZHENG LIANHE YANJIU  JIHUA  DIBAQI KETI BAOGAO [REPORT OF SHANGHAI JOINT 
RESEARCH SCHEME (Vol. 8)] 70 (2003). 
 158. See YU DONGZHI, DONGSHIHUI YU GONGSI ZHILI [BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 158-162 (2004). 
 159. See id. at 169-170. 
 160. See, ZHONGGUO GUFENZHI QIYE DONGSHI SHIDIAN [THE DIRECTOR DICTIONARY 
OF CHINA STOCK COMPANIES] 114-117, 175-177 (Xu Weiguo ed., 2000). 
 161. This attitude has sustained during the amendments of the Companies Act 2006.  
See RICHARD SMERDON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2007), 2.016, 
8.003. 
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judicial decisions scarcely defined the responsibilities and powers of the 
chairperson of the board due to the enabling nature of U.S. corporate 
laws.162  In Germany, the ranking of directors on the board was not of 
importance and the title of chairperson of the board was only a formality.163
Japanese law even totally ignored the role of chairperson in the statutes.164
In these economies, it was up to the company to decide on the powers of the 
chairperson as the laws does not enter into this field.  Sharply contrary to all 
these jurisdictions, Chinese company laws stepped in deeply to construct the 
role of the chairperson and assigned many statutory powers to the 
chairperson, such as checking and prompting implementation of resolutions 
of the board. 165   Hence, corporate autonomy regarding the role of 
chairperson in developed countries was replaced by statutory intervention in 
China.  On account of the exorbitant level of legal intervention, the 
operation of the board of directors became stereotyped.  In some 
circumstances, the board had to go through stiff legal procedures to 
legitimatize its behaviors and was not able to respond to the ever changing 
market.  Consequently, the efficiency of the board was sacrificed. 
Excessive legal intervention into the board of directors, nevertheless, did 
not mean that all indispensable mechanisms regarding proper functioning of 
the board were established in the law.  Consider the removal of directors 
before the expiration of their term of office.  Details vary, but developed 
countries usually gave corporate participants who elected directors the 
corresponding power to remove them mid–term.166  Nevertheless, Chinese 
law did not provide similar powers of removal to the corresponding 
corporate organs before the directors’ term of office was complete.
Adversely, the law spelled out clearly that the general assembly should not 
remove directors without cause before the expiry of their terms,167 implying 
that instead of providing the power to remove directors on a mid–term basis, 
in normal circumstances, the shareholders’ general meeting could not 
dismiss currently serving directors except in those circumstances where 
reasonable cause could be found.  And although the law allowed removal 
with just cause, there was no clear explanation of what cause would 
constitute grounds for removal.  In practice, even if the shareholders’ 
general meeting successfully removed directors, directors could file a 
162. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 6, at 344-45. 
163. See AktG, § 84(1). 
164. This is continuously demonstrated in the new Japanese Companies Act 2005.  
See Transparency of Japanese Law Project, KYUSHU UNIV., www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
165. See CL 1993, at art. 114. 
166. See Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.) § 182; MICHAEL FORDE,
COMPANY LAW 152 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
(1984), § 8.08; AktG, §84(1), 85-86; SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.]  art. 257, 343. (Japan); Shishido,
supra note 53, at 136. 
167. See CL 1993.  
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lawsuit against such dismissal due to the absence of a valid cause. 168
Without clarification of the cause for removing the directors, the general 
assembly would encounter a great deal of difficulties in winning the case.  
In sum, the power to remove directors before the expiration of their term 
was not clearly given in Chinese law, which gave rise to the potential risk 
for reckless behavior by directors.  
Another visibly absent regime in the Chinese context was the preventive 
mechanism against misbehavior of directors.  To avoid the potential threat 
to corporate and shareholders interests originating from the misfeasance of 
directors, the laws in advanced economies often allowed the corresponding 
corporate organ to turn to internal and external mechanisms before the 
wrongdoings gave rise to damage to the company and shareholders, such as 
injunction or declaration in the UK. 169   Unfortunately, there was no 
equivalent in the Chinese context in this regard.  Article 111 of Company 
Law, as the only legal rule relating to the right of shareholders to stop the 
misbehavior of directors, was very vague.  It combined the shareholder’s 
right of action against the general assembly and the board of directors.  
Also, the action stipulated in this article was against the board of directors 
as a whole instead of the delinquent individual director.  Strictly interpreted, 
this article was concerned with the shareholders’ right of action after the 
malpractice of directors gave rise to damage to the shareholders, rather than 
to provide an injunctive mechanism against the misbehavior of directors in 
advance.  There was no real device in China that could prevent the errors of 
directors before they caused real damage to the company.170  Due to the 
absence of such a legal mechanism, the Chinese board might have been less 
responsive to the shareholders and the company and more indulgent 
regarding their jobs.  Accordingly, the effectiveness of its function was 
weakened.  In short, Chinese law intervened in some areas where more 
168. There were a number of cases where the legal ambiguity regarding the removal 
of directors caused legal disputes.  See, e.g., DONGZHI, supra note 158, at 199-202. 
169. In the UK, injunction or declaration could be employed by shareholders where 
the breach of duties of directors is threatened, but has not yet occurred.  See DAVIES, supra
note 6, at 139-40, 425.  In the U.S., shareholders’ suit against the breach of fiduciary 
obligation with an injunctive nature is also allowed.  See COX & HAZEN, supra note 6, at 
169-70.  In Germany, the right of action to cessate infringement and eliminate ill effect was 
also made available to shareholders.  See GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT, supra note 
42, at 109, 171-72.  And Japanese law also expressly entrusted shareholders to the right of 
enjoinment of acts of directors.  See SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.]  art. 272, para. 73 (Japan).  This is 
now art. 360 under Japanese Companies Act of 2005.  See also Thomas L. Blakemore & 
Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions: Concerning Corporations, 2 AM. J.
COMP. L. 12, 21 (1953). 
170. See Hu Wentao, Queli Gudong De Zhizhi Qingqiuquan He Gudong Dahui Jueyi 
Xiaci Susong Tiqiquan De Sikao [Thoughts on Establishing the Shareholder’s Right of 
Prevention and Right to Sue for the Defective Decision of the Shareholder’s Meeting], 5
HUNAN SHANGXUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. HUNAN BUS. COL.] 59 (1999); see also Liang 
Shangshang, Tingzhi Qingqiuquan: Dongshi Lanquan Xingwei De Zhiizhi [Right of 
Prevention: The Prevention of Abuse of Directors’ Power], 2 JIANGHAI ACAD. J. 125 (2006). 
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freedom should have been given to the corporation, while other areas where 
more rules should be posed were ignored.  
On the other hand, even if these defects in the legal arrangements were 
remedied, the institutional environment would continue to obstruct the full 
discharge of functions by the board.  As a matter of fact, the intrinsic 
institutional factors disturbed the normal operation of the board more 
heavily than the legal/technical deficiencies mentioned above. 
Above all, the remuneration package of directors, as the major 
mechanism to motivate their work, failed to stimulate the positive 
performance of directors.  First, the overall income of directors was not 
closely linked with the market performance of the company.  Investigations 
showed that although the remuneration of directors was determined in law 
by the shareholders’ general meeting, in reality, the controlling shareholder 
usually prescribed the gross income of the directors in advance.  Based on 
his/her instructions, the remuneration committee under the board (if there 
was one) designed the performance evaluation indicators and assessment 
methods of the remuneration package, and then submitted them to the 
general assembly for approval.  So the actual amount of payment directors 
could receive was restricted to within the range decided by the controlling 
shareholder, which was executive–led rather than market–oriented. 171
Particularly, in SOEs, the remuneration of directors was by and large 
determined by the state assets representatives on behalf of the state 
shareholders.  As these representatives were only the working staff of the 
relevant government bodies, they could not decide on the remuneration 
based on market standards but only on government directives.172
Second, due to the immaturity of stock markets in China, the newly 
introduced equity–based incentive scheme could not motivate the 
enthusiasm of the directors, either.  Whatever form was used, an equity–
based package was closely related to the stock price of the listed company.  
The philosophy of equity–based remuneration was that, since the stock price 
was a good indication of corporate performance, linking the remuneration of 
directors to the stock price of the company could push them to do their best 
in enhancing corporate performance.173  Nevertheless, this assumption was 
not valid when taking the highly speculative stock markets in China into 
account.  It was widely reported that the domestic stock markets were 
171. See SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN JIAOYISUO YANJIU ZHONGXIN [RESEARCH CENTRE OF 
SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE], ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI BAOGAO (2004 NIAN) [CHINA 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT (2004)] 195-196 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REPORT]. 
172. Id.
173. Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance–Based 
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 
228 (1999). 
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strongly influenced by government policies,174 and the fluctuation of stock 
prices could deviate greatly from the true value of the firm.  The 
performance of the stock price could not, to a large extent, reflect the firm’s 
true performance.  Thus, the adoption of an equity–based remuneration 
package might not align directors’ personal interests with corporate 
performance.  Consequently, the equity–based incentive mechanism might 
have failed to motivate the interests of directors in taking good care of 
corporate performance.175  
In addition, the reckless behavior of directors was to a large extent 
attributable to inefficient law enforcement.  There were three types of 
liabilities of directors in China: civil, administrative, and criminal liability. 
In enforcing these liabilities, the judiciary, the prosecution authorities, and 
the major market regulator, CSRC, were all involved.  Unfortunately, none 
of them could make full implementation of the liabilities.  It was claimed 
that the true actor behind the judiciary and governmental bureaus was the 
Chinese government.  It was the government that did not pursue the 
disciplining of directors.  And sometimes, the government even eased 
actions against these directors.  Should the government be desirable to 
penalize the wrongdoings of directors, all three kinds of bodies mentioned 
above would have spared no effort to make the directors accountable.176  
Knowing the strong state interference in the enforcement of the liabilities, 
directors would like to develop a variety of social networking with 
government officials and seek protection of the government.177  As a result, 
they were not personally exposed to the risks of punishments or lawsuits.  In 
addition, the direct interest of the government in the listed companies also 
frustrated a shift in attitude towards the unsound practices of directors.  The 
Chinese government was the ultimate controller of most listed companies 
  
 174. See LENG JING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA’S 
TRANSITION ECONOMY 124 (2009). 
 175. Empirical evidence revealed that the accounting performance of companies did 
not increase with the introduction of an equity–based package.  To make matters worse, 
companies which had the intention of adopting such schemes usually had better accounting 
performance than other companies, but after the implementation of these schemes, this 
advantage reduced year by year.  See YANG, supra note 127, at 95. 
 176. See Zhengyi Lawsuit; Dispute Cases; Neil Andrews & Roman Tomasic, 
Directing China’s Top 100 Listed Companies: Corporate Governance in an Emerging 
Market Economy, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 245, 274 (2006); He Meihuan, Zhongguo 
Shangshi Gongsi ‘Yigududa’ De Wenti: Shangweie Zhenduan, Ruhe Xiayao [The 
Predominance of First Largest Shareholder: Not Yet Diagnosed, How to Give the 
Prescription], in TOU ZI ZHE LI YI BAO HU [PROTECTION OF INVESTOR INTERESTS], 109 
(Wang Baoshu ed., 2003).  Gu Gongyun, Cong Dongshi Zeren Jiaodu Kan Gongsi Zhili 
Jiegou Wanshan Yu Gongsifa Gaige [Corporate Governance Problems in Corporation Law 
Reform], in QUAN QUI JING ZHENG TI ZHI XIA DE GONG SE FA GAI GE [CORPORATION 
LAW REFORM FOR A GLOBAL COMPETITIVE ECONOMY], 25 (Wang Baoshu ed., 2003). 
 177. It was uncovered that whether state–owned or privately–owned, most listed 
companies would like to have at least one board member with strong connections with the 
government.  See Andrews & Tomasic, supra note 176, at 269, 273. 
2011] Director Regulation in China 533 
and had a significant interest in them.  Should the government have 
suddenly revealed and punished all the fraudulent and unlawful behavior of 
the directors, there would have been a stock–market crash where frightened 
investors would have pulled out of the market.  The result of this market 
panic would have been the potential loss of a large number of state assets.178  
The conflicting role of the government in the stock market led to its 
wavering attitude towards the implementation of legal rules.179  Hence, the 
crux of the difficulties in the enforcement of director liabilities stemmed 
from the complicated relationships among the directors, the government, the 
listed companies, and the stock markets.  And this problem could not be 
resolved overnight.180 
In general, neither incentive nor accountability mechanisms of directors 
were in full swing in practice because of the embedded institutional factors.  
The lack of institutional capacity may have partly caused directors to skimp 
on the quality of their performance, as well as contributed to the reduction 
of the overall effectiveness of the board, abuse of power to pursue personal 
interests, collusion with the management, insider dealing, and encroachment 
of corporate assets.181 
III. PROGRESS IN 2005 AND THEREAFTER 
A. New Changes Made 
The inefficient board system in practice calls for the advancement of an 
institutional framework and legal infrastructures.  With the promulgation of 
Company Law 2005 (“CL 2005”) and Securities Law 2005 (“SL 2005”), a 
new round of legislative movement has been initiated.  
1. Codification in 2005 
CL 2005 and SL 2005 are dedicated to consolidating the Chinese board 
system in two layers: the board as a whole and the directors individually.  
Generally speaking, although rules previously issued by CSRC are rarely 
  
 178. See Noëlle Trifiro, China’s Financial Reporting Standards: Will Corporate 
Governance Induce Compliance in Listed Companies?, 16  TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 271, 
289 (2007). 
 179. For more discussion of the conflictive role of the state in regulating information 
disclosure, see id. at 289. 
 180. Owing to the ineffective enforcement of liabilities of directors, few listed 
companies purchased liability insurance for the “unexposed” directors.  See He Min, A Study 
on D&O Liability Insurance in China [Lun Woguo De Dongshi Zeren Baoxian Zhidu], 5 J. 
NANJING U. FIN. & ECON. [ ] 90 (2004).   
 181. See Cheng Wei–qi & Philip Lawton, SOEs Reform from a Governance 
Perspective and Its Relationship with the Privately Owned Publicly Listed Corporation in 
China, in CHALLENGES FOR CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT: AN ENTERPRISE PERSPECTIVE 24, 30-31 
(David H. Brown & Alasdair MacBean eds., 2005). 
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adopted, the new laws take the same approach of enhancing the functions of 
the board and directors.  
In the first layer, the powers of the board of directors are expanded, and 
checks and balances are built into the board of directors.182  First, although 
powers stipulated in the rules of CSRC are not absorbed, CL 2005 has the 
same tendency to expand the powers of board of directors.  Apart from 
those powers stated in CL 1993, the board is also capable of deciding on the 
remuneration of corporate managers 183  and appointing members of the 
liquidation group.184  Particularly, the board is authorized to exercise other 
powers stipulated by the articles of association of the company. 185
However, unlike the attempts of CSRC, under the new law the board of 
directors no longer enjoy the discretion of examining the interim proposal 
submitted by the shareholders; rather, the board is obliged to inform other 
shareholders of such a proposal and table the proposal at the shareholders’ 
general meeting.186
Second, the dominant role of the chairperson is reduced to some extent.  
The chairperson of the board is no longer statutorily appointed as the legal 
representative; instead, based on the articles of association, the chairperson, 
an executive director or a manager can act as the legal representative of the 
company.187  The statutory powers of the chairperson are also diluted.  The 
functions of the chairperson can be substituted by other board members in 
some circumstances, such as where the chairperson fails to convene the 
shareholders’ general meeting or where the chairperson fails to perform 
his/her other duties.188  It is made clear that other than the chairperson, 
directors constituting one third of the total board members may also propose 
a provisional board meeting; and the chairperson should convene and chair 
the meeting within ten days of receipt of such a proposal. 189   And the 
practice of a casting vote for the chairperson in some companies is 
abolished under the new Laws, 190  as each director, including the 
182. In addition to the mechanisms introduced here, there are other changes which 
have substantive influence over the board system, such as the assignation of employee 
representatives as board members.  See CL 1993, at art 45.   The Company Law was revised 
in 2005.  See Dishijie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Duhui Changwu Weiyuanhui (amendments 
promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 
2006) art. 109 (China) [hereinafter CL 2005]. 
183. CL 2005, at arts. 47(9), 109.  
184. See Id. at art. 184.   
185. See Id. at arts. 16, 47(11), 170.   
186. See Id. at art. 103. 
187. See Id. at art. 13. 
188. See Id. at arts. 102, 110. 
189. See CL 2005, at art. 111. 
190. See JIAN FU & JIE YUAN, PRC COMPANY & SECURITIES LAWS: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE 81-82 (2006). 
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chairperson, is said to be given only one vote for each resolution of the 
board.191
Third, the exclusion of voting powers of directors is also adopted to 
avoid unfair transactions from its source.  In the event that the director of 
the listed company is a party related to the enterprise involved in the 
resolution of matters of the board meeting, he/she should abstain from 
voting on the resolution or voting on behalf of another director.192
In the second layer, regulations on the directors are also further 
advanced.  First, duties of directors are refined by synthesizing the 
fragmented rules by CSRC.  The duty of loyalty and the duty of care are 
clearly stipulated to be owed by the directors to the company, and the duty 
of good faith pinpointed by CSRC is deleted.193  A number of misconducts 
in violation of the duties of directors are listed.  These misconducts are, in 
general, akin to those in CL 1993, although several changes are made: two 
new misconducts, i.e. pocketing the commissions for transactions between 
the company and other parties, and abusing the powers to take advantage of 
corporate opportunities, are added;194 the use of company funds to provide a 
guarantee for the debts of shareholders is no longer regarded as a 
misbehavior of the directors but is then subject to the approval of the 
shareholders’ general meeting;195 and the breach of certain duties can be 
ratified by the shareholders’ general meeting or the board meeting.196  A 
provision as to the disgorgement of illegal income in violation of the duties 
is also added. 197   In addition, directors are prohibited from using their 
affiliated relationship with the company to cause loss to the interests of the 
company.198 They are required to attend the shareholders’ general meeting 
upon request and answer queries from the shareholders, and are further 
required to provide assistance to the supervisors when necessary.199  It is 
even emphasized, similar to the rules by CSRC, that the board of directors 
should duly call the shareholders’ general meeting for passing resolutions in 
certain circumstances.200  Last but not least, the directors, under SL 2005, 
have a duty imposed on them to certify information disclosed by the listed 
company, 201  and should bear joint liability for compensation with other 
191. See CL 2005, at art. 112. 
192. See Id. at art. 125. 
193. See Id. at art. 148. 
194. See Id. at art. 149 (5)-(6). 
195. See Id. at art. 16.   
196. See Id. at art. 149. 
197. See CL 2005, at art. 149(8).   
198. See Id. at art. 20, 21.   
199. See Id. at art. 151. 
200. See Id. at art. 105. 
201. See 2005 Zhengquanfa [Securities Law 2005] (promulgated by Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. [Dishijie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui], Oct. 
27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) art. 68 (China) [hereinafter SL 2005]. 
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relevant parties where the information disclosed is false, misleading, or 
substantively fragmented.202  
Second, accountability of the directors is strengthened by the 
enhancement of civil liabilities.  The new Laws repeatedly stress the civil 
liabilities of directors.  For example, directors who use their affiliated 
relationship to cause damage to the interests of the company should bear 
compensation liability. 203   As the implementation mechanism of civil 
liabilities, shareholders’ right of action against directors is intensified in 
several ways, including the action to invalidate the resolution of the board 
of directors,204 the derivative action,205 and the direct action.206  
Third, a few other rules related to the remuneration of directors are 
added.  The company is required to disclose information regularly to their 
shareholders on the remuneration of directors.207  And the strict restrictions 
on the transfer of shares held by directors under CL 1993 are relaxed for the 
preparation of adopting an equity–based incentive scheme: the company is 
permitted to repurchase its own shares for rewarding its working staff,208 
and directors, subject to the articles of association, are now allowed to 
transfer a limited stake of their shares within a certain period of time in their 
term of office.209 
2. Other Actions Taken 
The amendments of CL 2005 and SL 2005 pave the way for the revision 
of other relevant laws and supplementary regulations.  Most importantly, 
the new Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies       
( ) (“GAALC 2006”) , were issued by CSRC in 2006 to 
catch up with the changes in the two laws.  In addition to reiterating those 
rules of the new laws, GAALC 2006 goes further, with some supplementary 
rules which are ascribable to the smooth functioning of the new Laws.   For 
example, the legal procedure is provided to void any resolutions of the 
board which may violate laws and administrative regulations. 210   And 
replacement procedures are provided where the moderator of the 
shareholders’ general meeting (usually the chairperson of the board) 
contravenes meeting procedures and blocks the meeting from proceeding.211  
Two situations are added to the list of negative qualifications of the 
  
 202. SL 2005, at art. 69. 
 203. See CL 2005, at art. 21.   
 204. See Id. at art. 22.   
 205. See Id. at art. 152. 
 206. See Id. at art. 153. 
 207. See Id. at art. 117. 
 208. See Id. at art. 143(3). 
 209. See CL 2005, at art. 142. 
 210. See GAALC 1997, at art. 34; But cf. CL 2005, at art. 22. 
 211. See Id. at art. 67. 
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directors, including being banned from the securities markets by CSRC and 
other contents prescribed by the laws, administrative regulations and 
departmental regulations.212  The validity period of the duty of loyalty is 
also specified.213  These supplementary rules are conducive to building a 
better framework for regulating directors.  
What is unpredictable is that GAALC 2006 also provides some articles 
which are in contradiction with the two laws.  For example, powers of the 
board listed in GAALC 1997 but not absorbed in CL 2005 reappear in 
GAALC 2006, with one change, which extends the decisive power on 
security matters to external investment, purchase and sale of assets, 
appointment to finance management, and related party transactions.214  And 
whilst the board of directors may also enjoy the right to appoint the 
accounting firm of the company according to the articles of association 
under CL 2005,215 this matter is regarded as being exclusively determined 
by the shareholders’ general meeting in GAALC 2006. 216   Moreover, 
misconducts listed in CL 2005 are all classified as cases in breach of the 
duty of loyalty in GAALC 2006,217 and a new list delineating the violation 
of duty of care is added, including making sure that the business of the 
company does not exceed the scope of activities specified by the business 
license; treating all shareholders equally; keeping abreast of the business 
operation and management of the company; ensuring that the information 
disclosed by the company is true, accurate and complete; and truthfully 
supplying relevant information to the supervisory board.218
There are other efforts made by CSRC and the two stock exchanges to 
regulate the board system around this period.  First, at the dawn of the 
enactment of CL 2005, CSRC established a training system for senior 
management of listed companies including directors.219  In particular, the 
chairperson of the board and the chief executive officer should attend 
training courses at least once every year. 220   Second, the surveillance 
212. See Id. at art. 95. 
213. See Id. at art. 101. 
214. See Id. at art. 107 (8); cf. Id. at art. 94 (8). 
215. See CL 2005, at art. 184.   
216. See GAALC 1997, at art. 159. 
217. See Id. at art. 97. 
218. See Id. at art. 98. 
 219. See Shangshi Gongsi Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Peixun Gongzuo Zhiyi [Working 
Guidelines for the Training of Senior Management of Listed Companies] (promulgated by 
China Sec. Reg. Comm’n. [Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Dec. 22, 
2005, effective Dec. 22, 2005) art. 3 (China). 
 220. See Shangshi Gongsi Dongshizhang Zongjingli Peixun Shishi Xize 
[Implementation Rules of the Training of Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer of Listed 
Companies] (promulgated by China Sec. Reg. Comm’n. [Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu 
Guanli Weiyuanhui], Dec. 22, 2005, effective Dec. 22, 2005) art. 3(1) (China). 
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measures of CSRC, such as reprimand, 221  correction order, supervisory 
conversation, warning, bad credit record, and decisions concerning the 
inappropriate person for a position, are clarified under the new legal 
framework.222  And more rules as to the administrative punishments and 
their implementation measures are issued by the two stock exchanges.223
Third, with the promulgation of CL 2005 and SL 2005 and the 
implementation of the split share structure reform, equity–based incentive 
schemes have been pushed to the front of reform by the enactment of a 
series of regulations.224
Other legislation also sheds light on the liabilities of directors.  The new 
Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy states that where a director’s breaches of 
duties contribute to the bankruptcy of the enterprise, he/she is banned from 
assuming the same position of any enterprise within three years of the day 
 221. See Shangshi Gongsi Gudong Dahui Guize [Rules for the Shareholders’ General 
Meeting of Listed Companies] promulgated by China Sec. Reg. Comm’n [Zhongguo 
Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Mar. 16, 2006, effective Mar. 16, 2006) art. 48 
(China) [hereinafter RSGMLC]. 
 222. See, e.g., Shangshi Gongsi Xinxi Pilu Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures 
for Information Disclosure of Listed Companies] (promulgated by China Sec. Reg. Comm’n 
[Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Jan. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 30, 2007) 
art. 59 (China). 
 223. See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Jilv Chufen Shishi Xize [Rules for the 
Implementation of Disciplinary Actions in Shanghai Stock Exchange], (promulgated by 
Shanghai Stock Exch. [Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo], July 1, 2008, effective July 1, 2008) 
(China); Shenzhen Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zilv Jianguan Cuoshi He Jilv Chufen Cuoshi Shishi 
Xize (Shixing) [Rules for the Implementation of Self-regulatory Measures and Disciplinary 
Actions in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Provisional)] (promulgated June 2, 2009, effective 
June 2, 2009) (China). 
 224. Shangshi Gongsi Guquan Jili Guanli Banfa (Shixing) [Administrative Measures 
for the Equity-based Incentive Schemes in Listed Companies (Provisional)] (promulgated by 
China Sec. Reg. Comm’n. [Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Dec. 31, 
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (China); Guoyou Konggu Shangshi Gongsi (Jingnei) Shishi 
Guquan Jili Shixing Banfa [Provisional Measures for the (Domestic) Implementation of 
Equity-based Incentive Schemes in State-holding Listed Companies] (promulgated by the 
Min. of Fin. and State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm. [Caizhengbu, Guoyou 
Zichan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Sep. 30, 2006, effective Sep. 30, 2006) (China); Guquan 
Jijli Youguan Shixiang Beiwanglu Yihao [Memorandum of Issues Related to Equity-based 
Incentive Schemes No.1] (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Comm. [Zhongguo 
Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], May 6, 2008, effective May 6, 2008) (China); 
Guquan Jili Youguan Shixiang Beiwanglu Erhao [Memorandum of Issues Related to Equity-
based Incentive Schemes No.2] (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Comm. 
[Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Mar. 17, 2008, effective Mar. 17, 2008) 
(China); Guquan Jili Youguan Shixiang Beiwanglu Sanhao [Memorandum of Issues Related 
to Equity-based Incentive Schemes No.3] (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory 
Comm., Sep. 16, 2008, effective Sep. 16, 2008) (China); Shangshi Gongsi Dongshi Jianshi 
He Gaoji Guanli Renyuan Suochi Ben Gongsi Gufen Jijqi Biandong Guanli Guize 
[Administrative Measures for the Management of Shares Held by Directors, Supervisors and 
Senior Management of Listed Companies] (promulgated by China Sec. Reg. Comm’n. 
[Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui], Apr. 5, 2007, effective Apr. 5, 2007) 
(China). 
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when the procedures for bankruptcy are concluded.225  And the criminal 
liabilities of the directors are also strengthened by amendments to the 
Criminal Code to create a new crime.  It is stated that where the directors 
are in breach of their duty of loyalty and take advantage of their position to 
manipulate the listed companies, and therefore cause serious loss to the 
company, they should be subject to criminal imprisonment and fines.226
B. Lasting Selection and Perseverance  
The approaches taken in these new measures to regulate the board 
system demonstrate the continuous fusing nature of Chinese law in the 
sense that both common law and civil law features are incorporated 
simultaneously in the new framework.  First, rules from common law 
countries continue to influence Chinese laws.  The incorporation of the duty 
of not taking advantage of corporate opportunity is one of the instances.  In 
common law countries, use of corporate opportunities for a director’s own 
profit is regarded as a breach of his duty of loyalty and is strictly prohibited, 
unless authorization by the disinterested directors is given or ratification in 
the general meeting is obtained.227  This so–called “corporate opportunity 
doctrine” is mainly emphasized in common law countries, but falls short in 
civil law jurisdictions.228  With the introduction of this application of the 
duty of loyalty, Chinese law carries forward the transplantation of common 
law principles.  Second, the more stringent duty of secrecy reflects the 
influence of civil law traditions, especially the German law regime.  In 
Germany, the duty of not divulging secrets concerning company matters is 
particularly stressed under the duty of care, and preclusion of this duty by 
the approval of the general assembly is not provided in the statute.229  By 
deleting the provisions for ratification by the general meeting,230 Chinese 
law further enhances this duty of the directors and adopts an approach quite 
close to the German rule.  The new amendments are evidence of continuity 
of the combination of different systems. 
Chinese characteristics, nevertheless, stand out distinctively from all 
these transplantations from other laws.  First, albeit with more powers, the 
board of directors is reserved as a lower corporate organ vis–à–vis the 
 225. See Qiye Pochanfa [Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy] (promulgated by Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. [Quanguo Renda Changweihui], Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 
1, 2007) art. 125 (China). 
 226. See Xingfa Xiuzhengan [Sixth Amendment of Criminal Law] (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. [Quanguo Renda Changweihui], June 29, 2006, 
effective June 29, 2006) art. 9 (China) [hereinafter SACL]. 
 227. See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 6, at 416-23; COX & HAZEN, supra note 6, § 11.08. 
 228. For example, it is said that neither the duty of non–competition nor the duty of 
care could cover the duty of not taking advantage of corporate opportunity in Japanese law.
See ZHOU YOUSU, XIN GONGSIFA LUN [NEW SURVEY ON CORPORATION LAW] 404 (2006).  
 229. See AktG, § 93(1). 
 230. See CL 2005, at art. 184; cf. CL 1992, at art. 62. 
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general assembly.  This is visible in the unchanged wording regarding the 
general power allocation between the shareholders’ general meeting and the 
board of directors in CL 2005.231  It is further laid down in GAALC 2006 
that the board of directors cannot be authorized to exercise those same 
powers as the shareholders’ general meeting,232 and matters of the board 
beyond the scope of authorization of the shareholders’ general meeting 
should be submitted to the shareholders’ general meeting for discussions.233
The objective of GAALC 2006 is clear: the board of directors should not 
invade the scope of statutory powers of the shareholders’ general meeting; 
and, although authorization of the exercise of certain powers is allowed, 
such authorization should not alter the basic relationship between the 
shareholders’ general meeting and the board of directors.  Overall, the board 
of directors is kept as a body inferior to the general assembly.  
Second, even with more corporate autonomy, the modified legal 
representative system continues to be a unique feature of Chinese law.  
Although the company is free to appoint the chairperson, an executive 
director, or even a manager as the legal representative,234 only one person 
could be designated as the external representative of the company, and the 
range of powers of this single representative is definitely given in the 
laws.235
Third, the civil compensation liability regime of directors for breach of 
their duties has, at this point, been structured into a very stringent model, 
departing greatly from those in developed countries.  On one hand, 
shareholders’ direct action against directors for damages is, in China, 
constructed into a general rule rather than an exception.  In modern 
company law theory, directors are obliged to owe duties to the company as 
a whole rather than to the shareholders.236  As a general principle, directors 
are not subject to shareholders’ direct action for compensation, even if the 
interests of the shareholders are damaged due to a breach of duties of 
directors.  In spite of discrepancies, in advanced economies, only under 
exceptional cases could the shareholders file such a direct action against the 
directors.  In common law countries, such exceptions are usually given by 
constructing duties of directors owed to the shareholders in special 
 231. See CL 2005, at arts. 38, 47, 100, 109. 
 232. See GAALC 1997, at art. 40. 
 233. See Id. at art. 107. 
 234. See CL 2005, at art. 13. 
 235. The modified legal representative system is unique in another way in the sense 
that even a manager can be assigned to represent the company externally.  In developed 
countries, potential candidates for external corporate representatives are limited to board 
members.  See Liu Jingwei, Zhanbuduan, Lihailuan’ De Fading Daibiaoren Zhi—Ping 
Gongsifa Di Shisan Tiao Guanyu Fading Daibiaoren De Xin [Guiding the Chopped but 
Tangled Legal Representative System: An Evaluation of the New Legal Representative 
System under Article 13 in the New Company Law], 4 HENANSHENG ZHENGFA GUANLI 
GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [ J. HENAN ADMIN. INST. OF POLITICS & L.] 107 (2006). 
 236. See TALBOT, supra note 151, at 153. 
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circumstances.  In the UK, only in particular dealings between directors and 
shareholders, which establish a special factual relationship between the 
directors and the shareholders in the particular case, can a duty be owed by 
the directors to the shareholders and therefore the directors be held liable for 
compensation.237  In the U.S., only in limited instances could a director be 
obliged to owe duties to its stockholders, such as in the event that a director 
deals with a shareholder directly or acts in a way which injures a specific 
shareholder, and therefore be held liable to the shareholder.238  In civil law 
countries, albeit with different approaches, the scope of shareholders’ direct 
action against directors for damages is also very limited, since directors are 
subject to shareholders’ direct action only in the specific cases listed in the 
laws.  In Germany, shareholders are not entitled to damages claims except 
for a few special cases where directors neglect to properly handle the 
collection of capital contributions.239  In Japan, directors are jointly and 
severally liable to the shareholders only in some special cases, too.  For 
example, where the directors exercise their duties in bad faith or with gross 
negligence, shareholders, who are a third party outside the relationship 
between the director and the company, could hold the directors liable for 
compensation.240  Opposed to the limited scope of compensation regimes in 
these countries, Chinese directors, in breach of their duties, are fully 
exposed to shareholders’ direct action for damages.  Under CL 2005, 
shareholders are entitled to sue the directors directly where the latter are in 
violation of the laws, administrative regulations, and articles of association 
of the company and infringe the interests of shareholders.241  And since the 
duties of directors have been codified under CL 2005, any breach of duties 
is then regarded as violation of the laws by the directors.  Hence, 
shareholders are conferred with the general right of action for damages 
against the breach of all duties of directors.242  The exceptional rules in 
other countries have been generalized to the commonplace in China in this 
regard.  
On the other hand, exceptions for releasing directors from civil liabilities 
in breach of their duties in other countries, such as the business judgment 
rule, are not available in China.  In the U.S., the business judgment rule, 
which is a review standard where the conduct of directors is assessed and 
 237. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 374-76. 
 238. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 423 (1997). 
 239. See Alexander Loos, Germany, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY: A WORLDWIDE REVIEW
288 (Alexander Loos ed., 2006). 
 240. See SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.]  art. 266, para. 93 (Japan). 
 241. See CL 2005, at art. 153. 
 242. For an analysis of shareholders direct action against directors see Liu Guiqing, 
Gudong Dui Dongshi Zhi Zhijie Susong—Dui Xin Gongsifa Di 153 Tiao Fali Jichu De 
Fan]si Yu Chonggou [Shareholders Direct Action Against Shareholders: A Reflection and 
Reconstruction of the Legal Basis of Art 153 in New Company Law], 3 FAXUE PINGLUN [L.
REV.] 70 (2006). 
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their position is vindicated by the court, applies to limit the duty of care of 
directors and affords directors protection.  Even if the directors’ failed 
decision causes losses to the corporation, the business judgment rule 
provides a safe harbor for them where the errors are unintentional.243  In the 
UK, although there is no statutory business judgment rule, both case law 
and statutes uphold similar rationale and achieve what U.S. courts try to 
redress.  Directors are excused for breach of duty and are not liable for 
mistakes as long as they have acted in good faith and without clear 
misfeasance.  This approach provides for similar relief as offered by the 
business judgment rule in the U.S.244  In Germany, after a landmark case 
which opened the window for protecting directors against liability, the 
American concept of business judgment rule has recently been codified in 
the Stock Corporation Act.245  In Japan, although there is no provision of the 
business judgment rule in the relevant statutes, its application in the courts 
has been increasing.246  In short, in these countries, directors are protected 
against liabilities under certain circumstances so that they are encouraged to 
engage in ventures which have potential for the corporation but at the same 
time entail some risk.  However, Chinese law does not provide such 
exceptions for the directors.  After boldly declaring the civil compensation 
regimes against the directors for the company,247 CL 2005 does not provide 
any rules for exempting the civil liabilities of the directors.  So, where the 
company files a lawsuit for damages against the directors or where the 
shareholders file a derivative action for the same purpose, the directors are 
not protected by any exceptions.  In sum, Chinese directors are exposed to 
greater risk of civil compensation in breach of their duties compared with 
other countries. 
With a powerless board, the legal representative system, and a very 
stringent civil liability regime for the directors, the Chinese board under the 
new legal framework continues to stand apart from other models. 
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C. Endurance of an Unsatisfactory State of Affairs 
It was expected that the effectiveness of the board of directors could be 
improved with all these efforts made by the legislature and other regulatory 
agencies.  Unfortunately, the real situation is not as optimistic as imagined.  
It has been commented by a prestigious researcher in China that the recent 
board reforms are more in form than in substance, 248  which has been 
confirmed by the latest empirical evidence.  According to the recent annual 
report of overall assessment for corporate governance of the top 100 
Chinese listed companies, the score in “responsibilities of board of 
directors” keeps reducing due to its ineffectiveness.249  More specifically, 
another set of data reveals that from 2007 to 2009, the average attendance of 
directors in board meetings in the top 100 Chinese listed companies 
continued to drop.250  This implies that the newly introduced “sticks and 
carrots” fail to induce the directors to be more active in performing their 
role in the company.251  
There are several reasons for the disappointing effects of the new reform.  
In the first place, the balance between corporate autonomy and legal 
intervention is not well struck in the new legal framework.  Although more 
corporate autonomy is guaranteed by the new laws, the scope of this 
autonomy is, compared with other countries, quite limited.  The powers of 
the chairperson of the board, although largely reduced, remain salient vis–
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à–vis other board members.  CL 2005, like CL 1993, statutorily appoints the 
chairperson to prompt and check the implementation of the resolution of the 
board.252  And although the rule that the chairperson can exercise other 
powers authorized by the board of directors is deleted from CL 2005, this 
provision reappears in GAALC 2006.  It is even clearly stipulated that 
routine or lengthy authorizations are permitted, provided that the “principle 
of caution” is followed by the board.253  Accordingly, the chairperson has a 
statutory dominant role on the board, and may even become the standing 
authority of the board.  Furthermore, limited corporate autonomy is 
exhibited by the inflexible ratification of prohibited acts of the directors.  
Under CL 2005, most of the prohibited acts of the directors could not be 
ratified; and in the few cases where ratification is possible, there are few 
alternative ways to ratify the acts.254  For example, the use of corporate 
opportunity, as a specific act in breach of the duties of directors, can only be 
ratified by the shareholders’ general meeting.  Neither the board of directors 
nor a change of the articles of association of the company could ratify such 
an act.  This approach is, in fact, too inflexible, because the convening of 
the shareholders’ general meeting is very expensive and time consuming.255
With these kinds of stringent rules, directors are continuously required to 
spend their time and energy on the legal procedures to justify their 
behaviors and the overall efficiency of the board is low.  As a result, its 
functions cannot be fully displayed.  
Moreover, the legal framework stays fragmented as the necessary legal 
intervention into the board of directors remains absent.  In terms of the 
dismissal of directors before the expiry of term of office, there are few 
improvements in the new laws.  Although CL 2005 deletes the provision 
that directors should not be dismissed by the shareholders’ general meeting 
without causes, 256  this provision re–emerges in GAALC 2006. 257   This 
indicates that a cause is still required to remove a director.  However, very 
few examples of what constitute “cause” are given.  The only case for 
dismissing the directors under CL 2005 is where the director triggers a 
negative qualification.258  Other than this, the law remains silent.  Puzzles 
persist where the corresponding corporate organ thinks of removing a 
director before the expiry of the term of office.  As far as the preventive 
mechanism against the misbehavior of directors is concerned, there is no 
 252. See CL 2005, at art. 110. 
 253. See GAALC 1997, at art. 112. 
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 256. See CL 2005, at art. 46; cf. CL 1993, at art. 47. 
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improvement.  Under the new legal framework, no articles stipulate a right 
or action that has an injunctive nature.  In line with Article 22 of CL 2005 (a 
replacement of Article 111 of CL 1993), shareholders are only entitled to 
bring an action where there are irregularities of the board meeting or where 
the resolution of the board is in violation of the articles of association.  They 
cannot file a lawsuit against an individual director or several directors based 
on misbehavior that may potentially pose risk to the interests of the 
company.  In addition, there are two new articles concerning shareholders 
right of action.  Articles 152 and 153 stipulate shareholders’ derivative 
action and direct action respectively.  Under these articles, shareholders can 
only file a lawsuit after they suffer substantial losses.  They cannot bring a 
lawsuit against the directors before any real infringement happens.  An 
action with an injunctive effect is therefore not available under the current 
framework.  In sum, the new laws fail to introduce the indispensable 
devices which have the effect of motivating directors from various 
perspectives.   
In addition, even with amendments to all these pitfalls in the new legal 
framework, the unchanged institutional background carries on impeding the 
effective functioning of the board.  In the first place, remuneration of 
directors is not enough to motivate the enthusiasm of directors in their work.  
On one hand, the overall income of directors is still not aligned with the 
market valuation of the company.  Statistics show that on the main board of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (“SZSE”), the total net profit of listed companies 
in 2008 declined by 40% compared with 2007; however, the average 
income of directors increased by 10% over the same period.259  This means 
that the correlation between the remuneration package of directors and the 
market performance of the company is very weak.  As a matter of fact, 
salaries of some directors are paid by other parties related to the listed 
company instead of the listed company itself.  These directors previously 
worked in the parent company, group companies, or affiliated shareholders 
of the listed company, and after taking position in the listed company, 
continue to receive remuneration from their former company rather than 
from the listed company itself.260   In listed SOEs, directors also act as 
government officials in the corresponding bureaus, and only receive 
 259. Xu Rong, 2008 Nian Shenzhi Zhuban Gongsi Gaoguan Xinchou Ji Guquan Jili 
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compensation from the government.261  Since decision–making power as to 
the remuneration of directors is not vested in the hands of a listed company, 
there can be a great discrepancy between the overall income of the directors 
and the market performance of the company.  On the other hand, the 
improved equity–based incentive regime in the new law is not fully 
functioning due to the speculative nature of China’s stock markets.  From 
2005 to 2008, the Shanghai Stock Index skyrocketed six–fold from 998.23 
to 6124 within two years, and then shrank 70% to 1664 within one year.262  
Although major stock markets in other jurisdictions also experienced a 
dramatic fluctuation in the same period, the amplitude of major indices in 
other financial markets was not as large as Shanghai.  The high volatility of 
Chinese stock markets reveals its continuous speculative nature which 
prevents it from reflecting the true market valuation of firms.   Plagued into 
this highly speculative market, the vigorously pursued equity–based 
incentive mechanism may fail to align the personal interests of the directors 
with the performance of the corporation they work for, and may be 
unsuccessful in stimulating the enthusiasm of directors.  
Next, the enforcement of the liabilities of directors has not been much 
improved.  This phenomenon is fully embodied in criminal cases.  In a 
typical criminal case, CSRC, the prosecution authorities and the judiciary 
are all involved,263 and the number of criminal cases then serves as a gauge 
of the level of participation of these major bodies in enforcing the liabilities 
of directors.  Disappointingly, although the number of administrative 
sanctions imposed by CSRC keeps increasing, the number of criminal cases 
has not risen correspondingly.  Particularly, among those cases where 
CSRC imposes administrative sanctions on directors, there is a substantive 
portion where directors are in violation of their duties in information 
disclosure, such as making fraudulent financial reports of the listed 
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company. 264   Although criminal liabilities of directors concerning such 
kinds of wrongdoing have long been codified, 265  very few of these 
suspected directors are subject to criminal liability.  And in the rare cases 
where criminal punishments are imposed on directors, the penalties are 
minimal.266  It is therefore observed that the relevant bodies are still very 
ineffective in prosecuting directors suspected of crimes.  This implies that 
the government which has the substantive power to mobilize the relevant 
bodies to enforce liabilities of directors continues to be reluctant in doing 
so, due to the entrenched relationship between the directors and the 
government and the conflicting role of the government in the stock markets.  
In sum, although the legal framework has been improved, institutional 
factors which could not immediately be changed continue to frustrate efforts 
for an effective board. 
CONCLUSION
To mitigate the agency cost generated from the separation between 
ownership and management, director regulation is of vital importance.  For 
centuries, this issue of corporate governance has been addressed in 
developed countries and regions.  In China, special attention has been paid 
to director regulation from the very beginning, when the modern corporate 
law system was introduced, and has progressed step–by–step over the past 
nearly two decades through the building up of a series of mechanisms and 
devices.  In the early 1990s, civil law factors, particularly Japanese law, 
have shown more impact on the Chinese system in terms of the details of 
legislative techniques.  Later, common law regimes, especially the U.S., 
have shaped Chinese law more substantially.  By looking at these changes, a 
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misconception may be formed that director regulation in China is shifting 
from the civil law family towards the common law tradition.  
A more careful scrutiny can, nevertheless, pinpoint the underlying 
problem of such understanding.  In the first place, director regulation in 
China has, from the beginning, never converged with a certain model in 
another jurisdiction.  The Chinese model is a combination of different 
systems.  Although more civil law ingredients were incorporated into 
Chinese law in the early 1990s, common law features, to a lesser degree, 
have also been shared by China.  As time goes by, more U.S. norms of the 
board, such as the committee structures, liability insurance, and equity–
based incentive regimes, have been promoted and gradually absorbed, but 
simultaneously, philosophies of civil law countries, such as the separation 
between chairperson and CEO, have kept on shaping the Chinese board.  It 
is evident that Chinese law shows itself to be made up of a mix of aspects of 
other models, rather than shifting from one particular model towards 
another.  
Furthermore, albeit with all these transplantations and mixes, a number 
of significant features, such as the limited powers of the board vis–à–vis the 
general assembly; the legal representative system; the approach of 
regulating duties of directors; and the civil compensation liabilities of the 
directors; stand out to show the Chinese characteristics which differ greatly 
from those of advanced economies.  Compared with those ideas that exhibit 
the mixing nature of the Chinese board, these features are more substantive 
in the sense that the borrowed elements only refer to the details of 
legislative techniques or are of a recommending nature, while the features 
with Chinese characteristics are of a statutory and mandatory nature.  These 
features are like the skeleton of the Chinese board, and distinguish the 
Chinese system greatly from its counterparts in other countries.  
In addition, as far as enforcement is concerned, the Chinese board 
encounters the problem of low effectiveness which is not an issue of such 
importance in other jurisdictions.  The embedded institutional factors both 
prevent the remuneration package from motivating the performance of the 
directors and deter the legal liabilities of directors from being fully 
enforced.  Due to the sustainability of these factors in the foreseeable future, 
the Chinese practice of director regulation will continue to be plunged into 
the ineffectiveness issue and will remain differentiated from other countries.  
Accordingly, in terms of director regulation, corporate governance in China 
has always walked its own road rather than moving from one model to 
another model. 
The evolution of director regulation in the last nearly two decades is 
better summarized as sinonization, by which foreign norms and institutions 
are altered to compromise with the Chinese conditions.  This can be 
observed from both legislation and enforcement.  First, foreign norms and 
institutions are diffused into the Chinese context during the legislation 
process.  At this point, if none of the foreign systems available seems to be 
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suitable for the case of China, the foreign rules are deformed and bent into a 
shape that departs greatly from that of the original countries.  For example, 
even though board centralism has been adopted in developed countries long 
before China started working on its own board system, this conception has 
not yet been accepted in China after two rounds of corporate law legislative 
movements due to the potential loss of state–owned assets.  And in response 
to the need of smooth transition, some unique systems were constructed in 
China after referring to the foreign rules.  The legal representative system is 
such a case, which sets up a special mechanism in the board based on power 
authorization regimes in other countries, so that the former factory 
managers could find places under the new system.  It is noteworthy that 
after this shaping and reshaping process, some indispensable mechanisms 
(e.g. the removal of a director before the expiry of the term of office) are 
lost, while some unnecessary legal burdens (e.g. the statutory powers of the 
chairperson of the board) are at the same time imposed.  Therefore, legal 
reform striking the right balance between corporate autonomy and legal 
intervention is further needed: on one hand, the powers of the chairperson of 
the board of directors should be further reduced and its role should not be 
preserved as superior so as to avoid the monopoly of powers of the 
chairperson, and the prohibited acts of the directors should be allowed to be 
ratified more easily; on the other hand, the mechanism of dismissal of 
directors before the expiry of a term of office should be further improved by 
clarifying the causes of dismissal, and a preventive mechanism against the 
misbehavior of directors should be given in law.  
Second, in terms of implementation, concepts transplanted to China may 
not be as effective as they are in their countries of origin, owing to special 
Chinese social and political conditions.  For example, good intentions of 
introducing the equity–based incentive scheme in China may be frustrated 
by the highly speculative nature of the Chinese stock markets.  And, more 
importantly, with the state having a substantial interest in the stock markets 
and standing behind the whole scenario, the wrongs of directors that have 
triggered the sanctions in the law may, very likely, go unremedied and 
directors not held accountable by the market regulators and the judiciary.  
Such problems will serve as barriers to the true application of foreign 
institutions even though they are fully adopted in China, and will keep the 
Chinese systems distant from the foreign concepts.  To effectively change 
this situation, a better social and infrastructural environment for director 
regulation is needed, such as healthier and more mature stock markets and 
the more distant role of the state.  To keep their remuneration subject to 
market discipline, directors should be paid by the companies they work for, 
not by another company or government department.  
In general, sinonization is the appropriate diction to depict director 
regulation in China from legislation to enforcement. 

